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We explore the changes in the wage gap of caste and gender groups in India. 
Traditional Hindu society divided people into social classes based on the caste 
system. The lowest of the castes have traditionally been economically disadvantaged. 
Women in India have typically been restricted to the household and their participation 
in the formal labor market has begun expanding only recently. We explore the 
changes that these two groups have experienced over the years using a nationally 
representative dataset.  
In the second chapter we decompose the wage gaps of these groups into 
explained and unexplained components based on the Blinder-Oaxaca (1973) 
decomposition technique. Our contribution to the literature here is the extension of 
 
  
the analysis of discrimination to a society with a clearly established social hierarchy. 
We find that the gross wage gap has reduced over this period, and the extent of the 
gap attributable to discrimination has decreased over time. We further decompose the 
wage gap into components attributable to wage differences and occupational 
differences based on Brown et al. (1980). We find that the wage discrimination 
component has decreased over time and the job discrimination component is 
statistically insignificant. 
In the third chapter we investigate whether there have been beneficial wage 
gains for women and lower castes because of increased competition following 
liberalization of trade in India. Based on Becker’s model of taste-based employer 
discrimination, it is expected that as an economy becomes more competitive, 
employer discrimination should decline. The trade liberalization reforms that began in 
1991 in India increased competition by lowering protection in certain manufacturing 
industries. Firms who could indulge a taste for discrimination when trade protection 
allowed supernormal profits may not have been able to continue to do so as 
competition eliminated such profits. Using individual-level data and tariff data from 
pre- and post-reform periods, we find that wage differences reduced for female 
workers relative to male workers in the more open manufacturing sector industries. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
We examine the changes in the wage gaps of two groups in India, namely 
caste and gender groups over a period of roughly two decades. This time period has 
been marked by substantial changes in the policy outlook of successive governments. 
Traditional Hindu society divided people into social classes based on the caste 
system. The lowest of the castes have traditionally been economically disadvantaged. 
Women in India have typically been restricted to the household and their participation 
in the formal labor market has begun expanding only recently. We explore changes 
that these two groups have experienced over the years using a nationally 
representative dataset spanning two decades.  
The second chapter contains a descriptive analysis of the actual wage gaps 
among these groups during this period. Using individual level data from the National 
Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) for the years 1983, 1987-88, 1993-94 and 1999-
2000, we apply the Blinder-Oaxaca (1973) decomposition technique to decompose 
the wage gap into explained and unexplained components. We further use the Brown 
et al. (1980) decomposition technique to examine if there is discrimination in the 
occupational attainment process itself which would explain the wage differences 
between male and female workers and between low and high caste workers. We 
expect that both affirmative action programs, to benefit the lower castes, and 
urbanization, which provides greater anonymity to workers, would result in lower 
wage gaps over time. We find that the wage gaps decrease over time and that 
occupational discrimination is smaller in magnitude (and statistically insignificant) 
compared to wage discrimination within occupations. We find that most of the wage 
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gap between low and high caste workers is explained by differences in productive 
characteristics. On the other hand, almost half the wage gap between male and female 
workers is unexplained by differences in productive characteristics. For this reason, 
Chapter 3 focuses on examining how increased competition affected relative wages of 
female workers.  
The third chapter examines the impact of the trade reforms of 1991 by directly 
examining the industries where tariffs were reduced as a part of the reforms. Based on 
Becker’s model of taste-based employer discrimination, it is expected that as an 
economy becomes more competitive, employer discrimination should decline. We 
find, as expected, that there is a greater reduction in the wage gap in industries that 
experienced greater reductions in tariffs. We find that competition in fact did raise 
women's wages relative to men's wages. For example, the reduction in protection of 
manufacturing industries reduced the wage gap between men and women and 
accounts for roughly 20% of the narrowing of the wage gap over the time period in 
which the trade reforms were implemented. The effect for lower castes was not found 
to be important which is consistent with other programs already guaranteeing a 
certain level of protection from discrimination and consistent with the results in 
Chapter 2 that suggest that it was mostly productive differences between these 
workers and others that caused their lower earnings. Chapter 4 concludes.  
In the remainder of this chapter, we present an overview of the Indian 
economy, the industrial and trade policies and the aforementioned reforms, and the 
economic and social position of castes and women in India.  
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1.1 Overview of the Indian Economy 
Following independence in 1947, Indian leaders adopted a mixed economy 
framework in order to achieve an industrialized economy while embracing goals of 
achieving equality. Since private entrepreneurs couldn’t be entrusted with the 
responsibility of caring for the needs of the multitudes, the government devised a 
means to control the private sector. The government set up a licensing system which 
regulated private production and reserved production in certain strategic areas for the 
government. The government therefore allowed for private production while adopting 
the central planning method of socialist regimes. The other concern that faced the 
government was developing the means to achieve greater equality between different 
groups of individuals.  
1.1.1 Industrial Policy: Five Year Plans and Licensing Regime 
India embarked on the path to industrialization and growth by adopting five 
year plans in the model of the socialist economies. The Planning Commission was set 
up in March 1950 to assess the material, human and capital resources and develop 
plans to use them in a balanced and efficient manner. The second five year plan is 
largely considered the most significant plan which directed greater focus on 
developing heavy industry and infrastructural support. The primary goals were to 
achieve higher national income and growth in employment opportunities to cater to 
the larger labor force generated by the increasing population, in addition to 
developing the industrial base. Subsequent plans focused on agricultural growth and 
poverty reduction among other goals.  
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The political leaders of the time under Jawaharlal Nehru desired to make India 
an industrial success and aimed to achieve this through an active role for the 
government. Nehru desired that the commanding heights of the economy should be in 
the public sector. In an attempt to develop a large machine-building industry, the 
government adopted a policy of import substitution and regulated private sector. The 
Industries Development and Regulation Act of 1951 installed the licensing system 
which required an entrepreneur to obtain a license to set up a new unit, expand an 
existing one, or to change the product mix. Licensing was to allow for better planned 
investment, prevent concentration of industrial power in the hands of a few, maintain 
regional balance of industries, protect small scale producers, encourage entry of new 
entrepreneurs, etc. However, bureaucratic procedures to get a license involved long 
delays while awaiting permission from several sources, which in turn opened up the 
opportunity to corrupt officials to speed-up the process as well as to obtain additional 
licenses. The system therefore ended up suppressing competition and 
entrepreneurship while promoting monopolies, which was exactly what it intended to 
avoid (Das, 2002). Thus the entire manufacturing sector was effectively controlled by 
the government which had discretionary powers regarding granting licenses to 
producers. There was however a gradual shift in industrial policy in the 1980s with an 
emphasis on cost-efficiency in Indian industry through domestic competition. 
1.1.2 Trade Policy 
On the trade front, export pessimism developed from the belief that exports of 
primary products (which were India’s main exports) would face adverse terms of 
trade in the world market; and a fledgling domestic industry meant that exports of 
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manufactured goods (which stood to gain in the world market) would take time to 
develop. The belief was that a viable balance of payments account would require 
minimizing imports, which led to the adoption of import substitution policies during 
the late 1950s. Imports were limited through quantitative restrictions and high tariffs.  
But by the early 1960s, planners recognized the importance of exports and 
adopted a number of export promotion measures. In addition there were attempts 
towards liberalization in the 1980s. This involved reductions in quantitative 
restrictions on imports, but were accompanied by increases in tariffs which 
effectively afforded greater protection to the domestic industry.  
1.1.3 Crisis and Economic Reforms of 1991 
A series of unfavorable domestic and international developments created the 
threat of an economic crisis in June 1991. The government (central, state and union 
territories) fiscal deficit as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) rose from 
9% in 1980-81 to 12% in 1990-91. The current account deficit as a ratio of GDP rose 
from 1.3% during 1985-90 to 3.3% in 1990-91. In addition the current account deficit 
was increasingly being funded by more expensive external commercial borrowings. 
The debt-service ratio (ratio of repaid interest on external debt to current receipts on 
the Balance of Payments) had increased from 10% in 1980-81 to 30% in 1990-91. 
The Gulf crisis and resulting uncertainties in oil prices edged India closer to a crisis 
combined with the political uncertainties at the time with frequent changes in the 
Central government. Foreign exchange reserves plummeted to about one billion 
dollars and India was on the verge of defaulting on its external debt. International 
commercial banks refused to extend new credit and international credit ratings were 
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downgraded. Inflation was at a high of 17% per annum, industrial production was 
falling, and overall economic growth had fallen to 1.1% (New Economic Policies, 
Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1998). 
To pull the Indian economy out of this crisis, a Stand-By Arrangement was 
worked out by the new government with the IMF, subject to India undertaking wide 
ranging reforms. The first part of the reforms required stabilizing the economy by 
reducing the fiscal and current account deficit and raising GDP growth. The second 
part of the reforms was structural adjustments that included industrial de-licensing, 
liberalizing trade policy, and de-regulation of the financial sector.  A New Industrial 
Policy was announced in July 1991, which among other things abolished licensing for 
all but 18 industries; industries restricted for public sector investments were cut from 
17 to 8; and allowed small scale enterprises to offer up to 24% of shareholding to 
large enterprises. 
In the external sector, there was an immediate devaluation of the rupee by 
22% and the introduction of a dual exchange rate system in July 1991. Import 
liberalization was undertaken such that except for consumer goods, almost all items 
of capital goods, raw materials, intermediates, etc. became freely importable. 
Different import lists were consolidated into a single negative list of imports requiring 
a license. Beginning in 1991-92, the government also began the phase of tariff 
reductions, bringing down the maximum from 300% in 1990 to 50% by March 1995. 
The dispersion of tariffs was also significantly reduced and quantitative restrictions 
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were eased. Export restrictions were eased and additional export promotion plans, 
such as the Duty Drawback Scheme and Advance Licenses Scheme, were initiated. 1,2  
Reforms were also undertaken with respect to the financial sector and 
monetary policy. Financial sector reforms included decontrolling interest rates on 
loans (above a certain amount), freedom to banks to open new branches, capital 
market reforms, etc. aiming towards eliminating administered interest rates and 
removing government interference in financial institutions.  
Almost 70% of the population is in rural areas, most of who work in the 
agricultural sector. The growth of this sector is therefore important not only for food-
security reasons in a country of one billion people, but also for the overall growth 
prospects of the country. The agricultural sector reforms removed most restrictions on 
movement of agricultural goods both domestically and for exports. Restrictions on 
agricultural exports were also substantially reduced. The lowered protection to the 
domestic industrial sector should reduce the anti-agriculture bias of the earlier 
protectionist policies. The competitiveness of agricultural exports should improve at 
the new exchange rate, and stimulate the growth of agro-processing industries. The 
development strategy during the ninth five year plan (1997-2002) for agriculture 
targeted sustainability of employment generation, food security and poverty 
alleviation. Regional plans were targeted to reach the full potential in each area and 
                                                 
1 Drawback means the rebate of duty chargeable on any imported materials or excisable materials used in 
manufacture or processing of goods that are manufactured in India and exported. Duty Drawback is equal to (a) 
customs duty paid on imported inputs including SAD (Special Additional Duty) plus (b) excise duty paid on 
indigenous inputs. 
 
2 Inputs required to produce exported products can be imported without payment of customs duty under Advance 
License. Advance License can be granted to merchant exporter or manufacturer exporter to import raw materials. 
Since the raw materials can be imported before exports of final products, the licenses issued for this purpose are 
called ‘advance licenses’. 
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infrastructure development was considered highly important. While the agricultural 
sector is a larger player than the manufacturing sector in their contributions to GDP, 
insufficient data on the magnitude of agricultural reforms precludes an analysis of the 
direct impact of the reforms in agriculture. We will therefore focus on the 
manufacturing sector and the impact of the trade reforms on the wage gaps among 
different groups. 
1.2 The Social Dynamics 
1.2.1 The Caste System 
The word caste is derived from the Portuguese word casta meaning lineage, 
breed or race.3 In the Indian context, traditional Hindu society divided people into 
social classes based on the caste system. It divides people into hierarchical and 
hereditary groups which determined the social and economic status of individuals. 
There are four main caste (varnas) groups: Brahmins (priests, teachers), Kshatriyas 
(warriors, rulers), Vaishya or Bania (businessman) and Shudras (laborer, artisan). 
Individuals further outside this order were referred to as the untouchables. 
Traditionally the three upper castes have dominated over the other two groups. The 
upper castes have traditionally been richer and more influential, while the lowest 
caste (untouchables) was relegated to menial jobs. Higher castes practiced the system 
of untouchability wherein they believed that contact with untouchables would defile 
them. The higher castes didn’t allow the lower castes to share the same resources 
(e.g., school, religious functions, etc.). Lower castes were therefore both 
economically and socially disadvantaged. 
                                                 
3 The caste system exists in India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and Japan among other countries. Anthropologists 
use the term caste to refer to a social group that is endogamous and occupationally specialized. (Wikipedia.org) 
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Table 1.1 presents work force participation rates for social groups in urban 
India. Between 1983 and 1999, comparing columns (1) and (2), work force 
participation rates have gone up slightly for male scheduled castes (SCs) but have 
decreased slightly for female SCs. The work force participation rates are higher 
among lower caste women compared to higher caste women, as seen by comparing 
columns (2) and (4).4 This can be partly explained by the fact that higher caste 
women may face greater social stigma in working outside the household, unlike lower 
caste females. Work force participation rates of male scheduled castes are slightly 
lower than of other male workers. 
1.2.2 Women in India 
Women in India have traditionally been restricted to the household, but formal 
labor force participation rates of women have improved (since independence in 1947) 
just as observed in other countries across the world. Trade theory predicts that relative 
wages of unskilled labor will rise in the long run in an unskilled-labor abundant 
country that opens up to trade. It was expected that labor-intensive industries in labor 
abundant economies would become export competing and women who tended to 
dominate labor-intensive industries would stand to gain. It is expected that opening 
up to trade benefit women in a low-skill abundant country like India.5 Joekes (1999) 
in her review of the literature on gender effects of trade reforms found a positive 
                                                 
4 The term lower caste is used interchangeably here to refer to Scheduled Castes, explained further in section 
1.2.3. It must however be noted that the scheduled castes are not the only ‘lower’ castes in India.  
 
 
5 Nordås (2003) found evidence of increased likelihood of trade liberalization raising employment and relative 
wages of women based on a case study of Mauritius, Peru, Mexico, Philippines and Sri Lanka.  
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relation between trade growth and women’s employment and relative wages, with 
highest impact in the lowest income countries.   
The work force participation rates for women are lower than for men 
throughout the periods being studied, but the work force participation rates are higher 
among lower caste women compared to higher caste women. The numbers are 
presented in Table 1.2. While it’s expected that opening up to trade benefits women 
and lower castes in a low-skill abundant country like India, the work force 
participation numbers don’t reflect it. This may be partly due to the fact that a large 
proportion of women work in the unorganized sector, which means that they may not 
be getting counted into the official statistics on employment. Thus while women’s 
employment may actually be increasing during this time, official numbers may not 
reflect it.  
1.2.3 Anti-discrimination Policies 
The Constitution was written by members of the Constituent Assembly which 
was convened in December 1946. The Constitution was fully adopted on January 26, 
1950. The preamble to the Constitution declared the country a sovereign democratic 
republic which promised justice, liberty and equality for all.  
As part of ensuring equal opportunity for all groups, affirmative action (article 
335 of the Constitution) for untouchables was introduced in the form of reservation of 
a certain percentage of jobs in the public (government) sector jobs for these groups. 
The lowest castes which were thought to be candidates for such reservation were 
listed in a schedule of the Constitution and hence they are referred to as the Scheduled 
Castes. They constituted about 12-15% of the population. Hence 12.5% of all 
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government jobs were reserved for scheduled castes. This was modified to 15% in 
1970. Free schooling, subsidized higher education, as well as free training to prepare 
for the entrance examinations for the government services were made available to 
scheduled castes. Job reservations which were originally intended for a decade 
continue till date.  
Affirmative action was also extended to tribal communities that had largely 
functioned outside the purview of modern communities. Tribes that were considered 
economically and socially disadvantaged and in need of programs to help their 
assimilation into society were identified and listed in another schedule of the 
Constitution. 7.5% of all government jobs were reserved for members of these 
Scheduled Tribes. In addition, article 46 of the Constitution noted that the State shall 
promote the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people 
and in particular that of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Articles 338 and 
338A specified the creation of National Commissions for Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes to evaluate and monitor the working of safeguards for these groups.  
Equality of sexes is guaranteed by Article 15 which declares that the 
government shall not discriminate against any citizen on the grounds of sex. Article 
15(3) allows the government to undertake affirmative action programs in favor of 
women and article 42 directs the State to ensure humane conditions of work. Article 
39 directs the State to ensure equal pay for equal work for both men and women.  
While there is legislation in place to ensure equal treatment of all citizens, 
there is a substantial difference in the outcomes of different groups. While article 45 
of the Constitution directs the State to provide free and compulsory education to all 
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children till they are 14 years of age, there are substantial differences in the 
educational achievements of women compared to men and of lower castes compared 
to higher castes. The overall literacy rate for women is 39% compared to 64% for 
men. While differences in such productive characteristics are one potential 
explanation of wage gaps between men and women workers, other factors, such as 
discrimination in access to education, jobs, etc. are also plausible explanations. In the 
next chapter, we examine the extent of the wage gap between these groups and 
determine the part of the gap that is unexplained by these productive characteristics.  
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Chapter 2 Discrimination in Urban Indian Labor Market: 
Decomposing the Wage Gap for Gender and Caste Groups 
2.1 Introduction 
Wage inequalities among race, gender and social groups have been 
extensively studied in both developed and developing countries. The explanations 
provided for such wage differences are several, including the human capital theory, 
compensating differentials, search models, and discrimination. Human capital is the 
embodiment of productivity in people. The human capital theory predicts that 
earnings are higher for those with higher education and experience. Even after 
controlling for all observable factors such as education, age, experience, marital 
status, occupation and industry in earnings regressions developed by the human 
capital theory, wage differentials between workers may not be fully explained. The 
segment of the wage gap that is not explained by observable differences in worker 
characteristics is typically attributed to discrimination in the Blinder-Oaxaca (1973) 
decomposition technique.  
Discrimination in the labor market has been studied extensively, particularly 
in developed countries. The main economic theory to study discrimination was 
developed by Gary Becker, in the 1950s. Becker developed a neoclassical model, 
with typical neoclassical assumptions of perfect competition in labor markets and 
utility maximization, using the concept of a taste for discrimination on the part of 
employers, employees or customers to examine the consequences of discrimination, 
where it exists. Becker proposes that this taste for discrimination creates a wage 
differential in the short run, as a result of the willingness on the part of discriminators 
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to bear an additional cost in order to avoid any association with certain other agents. 
But employer discrimination is predicted to disappear in the long run, subject to 
constant returns to scale production technology and the distribution of tastes. Becker 
highlights that in an open market economy there will be competitive forces working 
against discrimination. He views economic discrimination as a reflection of market 
imperfections. This theory was mainly applied to study racial discrimination but was 
extended later to analyze other forms of discrimination including gender 
discrimination.  
Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) both independently developed a statistical 
model to estimate discrimination. They decomposed the earnings differential into a 
component explained by differences in personal characteristics of workers that 
affected their productivity and a component unexplained by observable productive 
differences and therefore attributable to discrimination. This has been a widely used 
technique to assess the extent of discrimination and has been applied to study both 
racial and gender discrimination.6   
Studies on developing country discrimination have mostly focused on a select 
country. We follow along this line and focus on studying discrimination in the Indian 
labor market on the basis of gender and caste. We focus on these groups because they 
have traditionally been economically disadvantaged. The caste system is a 
hierarchical and hereditary system and the lowest castes have typically been 
economically and socially disadvantaged. Women have traditionally been restricted to 
working within the household and have much lower formal labor force participation 
                                                 
6 We discuss the limitations of this strategy in Section 2.4. 
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rates than men. Females and lower castes in India have lower levels of education and 
experience than males and higher castes. This difference in human capital can be one 
explanation of wage gaps between gender and caste groups. However, studies 
(Sambamoorthi, 1984; Banerjee and Knight, 1985) have found the existence of wage 
and job discrimination against female workers and lower caste workers in India using 
decomposition analyses developed by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973). Banerjee 
and Knight (1985) found that there was wage discrimination against lower caste 
workers in a study of migrant workers in Delhi. This is particularly relevant since 
affirmative action programs which were begun in 1950 have reserved a certain 
percentage of jobs in the public sector to lower caste workers.  
We contribute to the literature by conducting a systematic analysis of the 
wage gaps between male and female workers and between low and high caste 
workers. While some analysis of wage gaps has been conducted for specific regions 
or firms in India, there has been no country-wide analysis. We use a nationally 
representative dataset to analyze the changes, if any, in the extent of the wage gap for 
caste groups and gender groups over a period of almost two decades. We find that the 
wage gap between male and female workers has decreased and between low and high 
caste workers has increased slightly over the period under study. We also find that the 
explained component of the wage gap has increased over time. However based on the 
occupational decomposition of the wage gap, we find that discrimination in wages 
within occupations is more important than discrimination in access to occupations. 
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly describes the literature 
on labor market discrimination; Section 3 presents the methodology; Section 4 
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describes the data; Section 5 presents and analyzes the results on the existence of 
discrimination, and Section 6 concludes. 
2.2 Literature on Labor Market Discrimination 
Labor market discrimination consists of treating equally productive people 
differently in the labor market based on characteristics unrelated to an individual’s 
productivity. Most studies on discrimination in developed countries have focused on 
explaining wage gaps between men and women and between races. The primary 
approaches in the literature include the neoclassical approach [primary among them 
Becker (1957), Arrow (1972), Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973)], statistical 
discrimination approach [Aigner and Cain (1977)] and segmented labor market 
approach or the dual labor market hypothesis [(Doeringer (1986); Reich et al. (1973)]. 
2.2.1 Theoretical Literature 
Becker models discrimination as arising out of the utility maximizing 
behavior of employers who suffer a disutility from employing certain workers and are 
therefore willing to give up some profits in the bargain. In an otherwise perfectly 
competitive world, the distaste of some discriminating firms from employing certain 
workers generates the discrimination coefficient, a monetary premium that such firms 
are willing to pay to not associate with those workers. Let us suppose firms can 
choose between hiring white or black workers, both groups being equally productive. 
However some employers dislike hiring black workers such that if the market wage 
rate for white workers is w, then the effective wage rate for black workers becomes w 
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+ d, where d is the discrimination coefficient. This results in the discriminating firms 
hiring fewer black workers than a non-discriminating firm.  
We illustrate this outcome using the analogous case of male and female 
workers in Figure 1 which illustrates the discrimination of employers against female 
workers. The horizontal axis represents the number of female workers employed and 
the vertical axis represents wages and productivity. Both male and female workers are 
assumed to be equally productive and therefore have the same marginal revenue 
product of labor represented by the MRP curve. The equilibrium is determined by the 
profit maximizing condition in the labor market which requires that the wages paid to 
workers should equal their marginal productivity. Assuming a perfectly competitive 
labor market, the firm cannot alter the market wage wF. The non-discriminating firm 
applies the profit maximizing condition and chooses to operate at point A where the 
market wage equals MRP. Discriminating firms dislike hiring female workers, and 
this makes them act as if women are less productive than men. The more biased 
(larger d) an employer, the more the actual productivity of female workers is 
undervalued by discriminating firms. This results in discriminating firms equalizing 
the market wage to a modified (subjective) estimate of female worker productivity 
which is less than actual female productivity. Therefore discriminating firms 
maximize profits at B where the market wage equals MRP – d, and therefore employ 
fewer workers than a non-discriminating firm. Since male and female workers are 
equally productive this equilibrium implies that the discrimination coefficient, d, is 
the extent by which male wages exceed female wages. Notice that the profit of firms 
equals the difference between total revenue and total cost. Figure 1 shows that in 
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equilibrium discriminating firms make lower profits than non-discriminating firms by 
the amount of the triangular area ABC. 
Since discriminating firms are not utilizing factors of production efficiently, 
they suffer losses in the short run which cannot be sustained in the long run. 
Therefore discriminating firms, in the Becker model, will have to either shut down or 
sell off to non-discriminators in the long run, subject to certain conditions pertaining 
to the production function and distribution of tastes. 
Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) have contributed to this literature by 
devising the technique to decompose earnings differences between groups. If we 
suspect wage differences to be due to discrimination, this technique can identify the 
possible extent of such discrimination. The technique depends on identifying 
characteristics of individuals that affect their productivity and therefore their wages, 
such that the share of the wage gap not accounted for by such productive factors is the 
unexplained wage gap, all or some of which may be due to discrimination. Though 
the technique suffers from the index number problem, it is definitely a valuable first 
step towards analyzing discrimination which was further developed by others (e.g. 
Brown et al. 1980).7  
Several economists including Arrow (1972) and Phelps (1972) argue that 
traditional neoclassical theory fails to explain the existence of discrimination. They 
propose the statistical model of discrimination based on employer uncertainty about a 
worker’s productivity and therefore reliance on group characteristics to judge an 
individual. This can be explained by the following example. 
                                                 
7 The index number problem is discussed in the methodology section 2.4.1.  
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Assume there are two races in the economy: W and B, and that the true 
productivity of each individual cannot be observed, but we know the average 
productivity of the races. Thus in the event that two people from these two groups 
seek employment at the same firm, the firm lacking any other information on the 
individual, will fall back on the average performance of individuals from that group 
to conclude what the individual’s productivity is likely to be, and choose the one who 
belongs to the higher average productivity group. In doing so the firm may be hiring 
someone who is below average from the high productivity group and meanwhile 
reject someone who is above average from the low productivity group.  They are thus 
wrongly attributing low group characteristics to an individual who might be above 
average in the lower average productivity group, and therefore there is an additional 
problem of a negative feedback effect wherein such discriminated-against individuals 
will not have enough incentive to invest in human capital. This form of discrimination 
is however not based on any distaste on the part of the employer and as such is 
expected to be corrected by learning over time as employers observe the actual 
productivity of workers.  
Another view is that internal labor markets can explain the existence of labor 
market discrimination. Doeringer (1986) analyzed the segmentation of the labor 
market by firms and trade unions via the operation of an internal labor market. The 
uncertainties of the economy may make it efficient to offer workers an implicit wage 
contract which ensures stability for risk-averse workers. Efficiency wages (offering 
workers a wage above the prevailing market wage in order to induce them to not shirk 
and face the prospect of losing a ‘valuable’ job) might explain why wages may not 
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fall within internal labor markets. The bargaining nature and importance of social 
work groups within internal markets allows the existence of non-competitive forces. 
Higher productivity under the non-competitive conditions can generate higher rents 
that can be shared with insiders.  
2.2.2 Empirical Literature  
Several authors have analyzed the existence of discrimination in developing 
countries in recent years.8 The primary technique employed in these studies is the 
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition technique which classifies the part of the wage gap 
unexplained by productive characteristics as the discrimination component. Several 
studies have further used the Brown et al. (1980) method to distinguish between the 
components of discrimination (whether it is due to unequal access to occupations or 
due to unequal pay within occupations).  
Not much empirical work has been done on caste-based and/or gender 
discrimination in India. One of the earliest empirical analyses of caste discrimination 
in India was carried out by Banerjee and Knight (1985) who decomposed the caste 
wage-gap using the occupational attainment framework by Brown et al. (1980).  They 
restricted their analysis to male workers in the capital city of Delhi, and designed 
their own survey. Using 1974-75 data they found evidence of the existence of 
discrimination against lower caste workers in Delhi, and using the occupational 
attainment model they found that discrimination accounted for about two-thirds of the 
                                                 
8 See Scoville (1991) for a collection of studies on status influences in third world countries.  See Birdsall and 
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gross earnings differences, and that wage discrimination within an occupation was 
much more important than discrimination in access to jobs.   
Bhattacherjee (1985) estimated the extent of wage discrimination against low 
caste workers in a Bombay automobile firm. Based on the Oaxaca decomposition of 
the wage gap, he found evidence indicating that wage discrimination was reflected in 
the under-valuation of lower caste human capital and other characteristics, and this 
discrimination mostly stemmed from differential access to resources important to 
developing skills for the labor market.  
More recently, Deshpande (2000) examined the role of caste affiliation as an 
indicator of inter-group disparity. She formulated the Caste Development Index 
(CDI), based on the Theil index, to measure caste inequality and defined caste 
disparity as the distance between the CDI for low caste groups and for others (non-
low castes). She analyzed between-group and within-group disparity focusing on the 
southern Indian State of Kerala which has experienced greater social and labor 
reforms thanks to a communist regime and where caste is expected to be less 
important in the society. She used the Consumption and Expenditure Data from the 
National Sample Survey Organization for 1993-94, and considered three groups - the 
scheduled castes (SC), scheduled tribes (ST) and others.9 She found that overall 
inequality was not on the higher side, as was expected given the State’s social and 
political history. Contrary to expectations, she found evidence of inter-caste disparity 
in both rural and urban areas. But she found that the problem of within-group 
                                                 
9 Scheduled castes and tribes are castes and tribes listed in the Constitution which are deemed to be economically 
disadvantaged because of past exploitation and lack of opportunities. There are specific policies formulated for 
their development which include free schooling, reservations in government jobs, etc.  
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inequality was more a concern for ‘others’ than for the scheduled castes and 
scheduled tribes. 
We contribute to the empirical literature on labor market discrimination by 
extending the analysis to a country with a well known social hierarchy. The caste 
system has been the foundation of traditional Hindu society and while urbanization 
might provide greater anonymity to individuals, caste affiliations still affect their 
interactions. We also examine the changes with respect to women who are increasing 
their labor force participation compared to earlier years. We provide a thorough 
investigation of the changes in the wage gap over almost two decades for these 
different groups using the most comprehensive dataset available for the country. 
While past studies on India have focused on particular cities, we are able to conduct 
the analysis for almost the entire country.  
2.3 Data 
The data used in this study comes from the Employment and Unemployment 
Survey (Schedule 10) of the NSSO (National Sample Survey Organization). This 
quinquennial survey is divided into four sub-rounds and covers both urban and rural 
areas. It is a time-series of cross-sections with different households being interviewed 
each year. It contains detailed information on demographic and household 
characteristics of individuals (like age, education, household size, industry, 
occupation, etc.).10 The survey adopts a stratified two-stage design.11 This survey is 
available for four years, namely 1983, 1987-88, 1993-94 and 1999-2000.  
                                                 
10 The sub-rounds are from July-September, October to December, January to March, and April to June. Equal 
number of sample villages and blocks are allotted for survey in each of these four sub-rounds.   
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We focus on urban areas where there is more reliable wage reporting. India is 
a union of 29 States and 6 Union Territories. The analysis is restricted to 16 States 
which are typically the focus of studies on India. The omitted States are primarily 
those in north-east India, where frequent insurgency problems have affected data 
collection. The list of States is available in the Data Appendix.  
The education variables are defined based on completed years of schooling. 
We define six categories of education: not literate; literate but below primary; 
completed primary school; completed middle school; completed secondary school 
and graduated from college. The survey reports total weekly earnings of each 
individual. These are converted to real weekly earnings which are the primary 
outcome variable of interest. We focus on those aged 15-65 years and include marital 
status and household size information in the regressions to control for selection bias. 
We use a fourth order polynomial in age to account for gains in wages due to 
experience.  
Occupation of workers is listed based on the National Classification of 
Occupations (NCO), which is classified into ten one-digit level occupations; and on 
the basis of skill into six occupational groups: professional, production, clerical, 
service, skilled and unskilled workers (based on Banerjee and Knight, 1985). 
Professional workers include all professional workers and managerial, executive and 
administrative workers. Unskilled workers are from all other occupation groups, 
                                                                                                                                           
  
11The first-stage units are census villages in the rural sector and the NSSO urban frame survey (UFS) blocks in the 
urban sector. In 1993-94, the survey covered more than 69000 rural and 46000 urban households. The total sample 
size is determined by the relative population sizes of rural and urban areas with double weight to the urban sector. 
More than 97000 rural and 67000 urban households were surveyed in 1999-2000.  
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including the 'laborers not classified elsewhere'. Government workers get included 
here in the professional categories. We use ten one-digit industry codes, based on the 
National Industrial Classification (NIC) to identify the industry affiliation of each 
worker.  
2.4 Methodology 
We apply the Blinder-Oaxaca (1973) and Brown et al. (1980) methodology to 
estimate the extent of discrimination and the changes in the components of the wage 
gap over time.   
2.4.1 Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition Technique 
The Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) decomposition technique involves 
identifying all the productive factors that affect an individual’s wages and examining 
whether different individuals with the same characteristics are rewarded differently. 
We first run earnings regressions for each group of workers, namely non-scheduled 
and scheduled castes, and male and female workers. For sake of brevity, we present 
the equations for caste workers. The equations for male and female workers are 
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error term, and similarly for scheduled castes. The gross difference in average 
earnings can then be written as ssnn bXbXG −= , where b is the vector of estimated 
coefficients. We can add and subtract the term nsbX and rearrange G as follows: 
)()()( snsnsnsnsn uubbXbXXwwG −+−+−=−= ,            (1.2) 
where the first term on the right hand side represents the part of the earnings 
differential due to difference in characteristics (and thus the explained part), and the 
second term represents differences due to differential returns to the same 
characteristics (captured by different coefficients for non-scheduled and scheduled 
castes), and the third term is the difference in the averages of the error terms. The 
second and third term are normally attributed to discrimination. Alternatively we 
could subtract the term snbX  and rearrange G to obtain: 
)()()( snsnnssnsn uubbXbXXwwG −+−+−=−= .             (1.3) 
In equation (1.2) it is assumed that everyone is getting treated as if they were 
non-scheduled castes (by getting the same rate of return nb ), and therefore the 
discrimination was the difference in the b coefficients. In equation (1.3) it is assumed 
that everyone is treated as if they were scheduled castes. Either method can be used to 
decompose G, though clearly the explained and unexplained components will vary 
numerically across the two methods. This creates an index number problem since the 
components of the decomposition can vary based on which group is used as the 
reference group.  
Researchers (Neumark 1988; Oaxaca and Ransom 1988; Oaxaca and Ransom 
1994) have attempted to create other reference wage structures for the decomposition 
to solve this index number problem. Neumark (1988) suggests that the correct 
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reference group to be used for the decomposition technique can be determined if 
enough is known about the market which would enable one to decipher if, say 
females, are being underpaid (discrimination) or if males are being overpaid 
(nepotism). If females were underpaid, then the coefficients from the male earnings 
regressions should serve as the reference. However if employers are nepotistic, then 
they overpay men and therefore coefficients from the female earnings regressions 
should serve as the no-discrimination reference for the decomposition analysis. 
Neumark (1988) suggests using a weighted average of the male and female wage 
structures to estimate the non-discriminatory reference wage structure if enough is not 
known about the labor market and employer preferences. This involves assuming that 
employers only care about the proportion of each type of labor employed (that is 
employer preferences are homogeneous of degree zero). The Neumark decomposition 
of the wage gap between males (m) and females (f) can be represented by the 
following equation: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )m f m f m m f fw w x x x xβ β β β β′ ′ ′ ′− = − + − + − . (1.4) 
The first term represents differences in characteristics between males and 
females and is therefore the explained part of the wage gap. The second and third 
terms represent the share of the wage gap due to differences between the actual wage 
structure and the pooled wage structure (β) for male and female workers respectively. 
While this technique can avoid the index number problem, it might still be subject to 
problems, including omitted variable bias.12   
                                                 
12 The pooled coefficient may not be a good estimator of the non-discriminatory wage structure if there isn’t zero-
homogeneity restriction on employer preferences (Appleton et al. 1999). 
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2.4.2 Limitations  
The primary drawback of any decomposition technique, including the one 
described above is that it attributes everything that is not explained by observable 
characteristics, such as education, experience, occupation, etc., to discrimination. As 
pointed out in the literature, the problem with this technique arises if there are factors, 
such as an individual’s ability, which are not included in the list of productive 
characteristics (X) but affect wages earned. One solution would be to use a proxy to 
measure the relevant factor, for example using a test score on an IQ test as a measure 
of ability. Another option would be to use an instrument variable for the missing 
factor. By definition, the instrument should be highly correlated with the factor it is 
representing but should be unrelated to the outcome variable. Examples of 
instruments for ability would include parents’ education or family background that 
should explain each individual’s ability but at the same time doesn’t dictate the wages 
that they would actually earn in the labor market.  
The data being used in this study does not contain enough information on any 
proxy or instrument variable measure of such unobservable factors which could affect 
wages. Thus the results have to be interpreted keeping in mind that the entire amount 
of the wage gap unexplained by the productive factors is not necessarily 
discrimination. It is important to note that as long as we don’t expect any systematic 
changes in ability over time, the analysis of changes in the wage gap over time should 
not be systematically affected by this drawback. 
Another problem arises if people select in and out of the labor force based on 
some characteristic that is related to some observable productive characteristic, such 
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as education. This correlation between education and regression residuals would 
result in biased coefficients if we use ordinary least squares. We include household 
size and marital status to capture the effects of such selection bias.13  
2.4.3 Occupational Attainment Model 
The usual characteristics that get included in the list of explanatory variables 
are age, education, experience, etc. Occupational choices also explain wage 
differences, and are usually incorporated in this list. However if there was pre-labor 
market discrimination which in turn affected occupational choices, the traditional 
strategy would not give correct estimates of discrimination. It would generate lower 
estimates of discrimination since it would not have accounted for differences in 
occupational attainment. Brown et al. (1980) develop the strategy to further 
decompose the wage differential using a weighted average of proportions of workers 
of each group in every occupation to account for discrimination in the occupational 
choice itself. 




nsn wpwpww −=− , where ),...,,( 21
n
J
nnn pppp =  are the proportions 
of non-scheduled caste workers in each occupational group j=1,…,J, and similarly ps 
is the proportion for scheduled castes, and njw  are the average wages of non-sc 
workers in each occupation, and similarly for SC workers. Add and subtract nj
s wp  
and re-arrange: 
                                                 
13 In a future extension of this study we propose to incorporate the Heckman (1979) correction for self-selection 
bias.  
 






ssn ppwwwpww −+−=− = W+J.                 (1.5) 
The first term on the right hand side is the gross difference in wages due to 
difference in wages across groups within occupations, while the second term is the 
part due to differences in occupational composition. Each of these terms can be 
further decomposed into explained and unexplained parts. Add and subtract nj
s
j bX  to 
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s bbXpbXXp −+−= .    (1.6) 
The first term in equation (1.6) is the explained part of the difference in 
wages, while the second term is the part of the wage difference due to differential 
returns between castes and thus is attributed to discrimination.  
Next, let njp̂  be the proportion of non-scheduled castes that would be in 
occupation j if non-scheduled castes faced the same occupational choices as 
scheduled castes, and similarly sjp̂  be the proportion of scheduled caste workers who 
would be in occupation j if scheduled castes face the same occupational structure as 
the non-scheduled castes. The term J can be re-arranged by adding and 







sn wppwppwpp )ˆ()ˆ()( −+−=− .    (1.7) 
The first term in the above equation reflects differences in qualifications for 
the occupations, and the second term is due to differences in the structure of 
occupational attainment between non-scheduled castes and scheduled castes. Thus the 
full model becomes: 
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s wppwppbbXpbXXp )ˆ()ˆ()()( −+−+−+−=  .    (1.8)  
In the above equation, the second and fourth terms represent the parts due to 
discrimination in wages and occupations respectively. This method therefore gives a 
better picture of the true extent of discrimination. This exercise could also be done by 
adding and subtracting sj
n wp  in the gross wage differential equation instead to get 
equation (1.5) and adding and subtracting njp̂  in the J term to get equation (1.8). The 
probability that individual i is in occupation j as a function of exogenous variables is 











/)( γγ .                                                          (1.9) 
Here i= 1, …, n; and j= 1, …, J, ocj is occupation j, and X is the vector of independent 
variables. Similar equations are applied for male and female workers. 
2.5 Summary Statistics and Earnings Functions Analysis 
We begin by looking at the summary statistics (Table 2.1 and Table 2.2) for 
scheduled caste and non-scheduled caste workers, and male and female workers. The 
sample is restricted to those aged between 15 and 65 in urban areas in 16 States. The 
average real weekly earnings are much higher for higher caste workers than for 
scheduled caste workers, and for males compared to female workers. The ratio of 
average wages for lower castes relative to higher caste workers improves from about 
0.72 in 1983 to 0.77 in 1999-2000. The relative average wage ratio for female to male 
workers improved from 0.56 in 1983 to 0.74 in 1999-2000. Higher castes and male 
workers have smaller proportion of illiterates than lower castes and female workers, 
but there is an improvement in educational achievements for each group over time. 
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The highest proportion of workers from each group is those who have completed 
secondary education. The proportion of lower caste and female workers completing 
college doubles between 1983 and 1999-00.  
The summary statistics also list the proportion of workers in some of the 
industries and occupations. There are ten one-digit industries and we report the 
proportions employed in three sectors, namely agriculture; manufacturing; and 
community, social and personal services. The proportion of low and high caste 
workers in manufacturing is roughly similar and decreases between 1983 and 1999. A 
larger proportion of lower caste workers are engaged in agriculture (14% in 1983) 
compared to higher caste (11.6%) workers. The services sector is also a large 
employer of workers in all years except 1999-00. The proportion of men in 
agriculture is much lower than that of women, while both show a decline over time. 
Trends in manufacturing and services sectors are similar to that of caste workers.  
Of the ten one-digit occupations, we report the proportions employed in 
professional, services and production jobs. There is a larger proportion of non-
scheduled caste (6.4% in 1983) than scheduled caste (1.5%) workers in professional 
jobs. On the other hand there is a larger proportion of female (10.5% in1983) than 
male (4.7%) workers in professional occupations. The proportion employed in 
professional occupations has increased slightly over time for all groups of workers. 
There is a larger proportion of scheduled caste (25% in 1983) and male (16%) 
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workers in production jobs than higher caste (14%) and female (11%) workers 
respectively, and these proportions have been declining over time.14  
2.5.1 Earnings Functions Analysis of the Entire Sample 
We begin the analyses by examining the wage regressions for each year for 
the entire sample of workers and including dummy variables to identify wage 
differentials by caste and gender. The equation being estimated looks as follows: 
 
1 2ln ( ) ( ) ( * ) ( * )ikhj ikhj i i ikhj i ikhj i k h j ikhjw X male caste X male X casteα β θ θ σ ω λ γ π ε= + + + + + + + + +
.(1.10) 
The natural log of real weekly earnings (lnw) of each individual i is regressed 
on a set of demographic (X) and institutional (state λ, industry γ, occupation π) 
factors. The caste variable equals one if individual belongs to the scheduled castes, 
and zero otherwise. The interaction terms of X with the male and caste dummy 
variables is to allow for the educational and age characteristics to vary by gender and 
caste.  
State fixed effects are included to account for differences across states in 
prices; any state-specific differences in the labor market; or any other relevant factors 
that might affect wages earned. As mentioned earlier, the sample is restricted to 16 
States and the southern Indian State of Andhra Pradesh is the omitted category. The 
individuals are surveyed in one of four sub-rounds. Therefore a sub-round dummy 
variable is included to control for the season when the individual was surveyed. The 
omitted season is July to September. 
                                                 
14 The numbers in parentheses are for the same year as the first reference in each case, and there are similar trends 
over time.  
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Industry fixed effects are included to account for differences in returns to 
individuals across industries. There are 10 one-digit industries and agriculture is the 
omitted category. Occupation fixed effects are included to account for wage 
differences between occupations. There are 10 one-digit occupations and the omitted 
group consists of scientists, engineers, etc. The last term is the random error term. As 
mentioned earlier omitted variable bias is a common constraint of decomposition 
analyses. While there are remedies in the form of a proxy or instrument variable 
being used for the omitted variable, the dataset used in this study doesn’t have 
sufficient information to allow either of these solutions. We however contend that the 
analysis here is not necessarily hampered since we are interested in examining the 
changes over time. As long as the extent of the biases due to any omitted variables is 
not changing over time, we should still be able to derive meaningful implications 
from these decomposition results.15  
We begin by analyzing the earnings regressions assuming that everyone has 
the same returns to productive characteristics and examine the magnitude of the caste 
and gender variables. With reference to equation (1.10), we begin with the case where 
σ=0 and ω=0. The results in Table 2.3, Panel A show that the coefficient of male is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in all four years. The magnitude 
of the male coefficient in 1983 is 0.529 implying that on average male workers earn 
almost 53% higher wages than female workers, having controlled for demographic 
and institutional factors. The magnitude of the male coefficient reduces to 0.358 in 
1999-00, but remains statistically significant. We therefore analyze this wage gap 
                                                 
15 Jolliffe and Campos (2003) conduct the Blinder decomposition with a similar drawback of limited information 
in Hungarian data.  
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between male and female workers and determine what extent of this gap is due to 
observable characteristics. The coefficient of the caste (caste equals one if individual 
belongs to lower caste, zero otherwise) variable is negative and statistically 
significant in all years except in 1993-94. The magnitude of the caste coefficient is 
slightly lower in 1999-00 compared to 1983, at 0.031 implying that lower caste 
workers earn about 3% lower wages than higher caste workers.  
We also present regression estimates with and without the inclusion of the 
occupation fixed effects in Table 2.4. When occupation fixed effects are included 
(Panel B), we observe that the magnitude of the caste coefficient reduces while the 
magnitude of the male coefficient increases. The explanatory power (in terms of the 
adjusted R squared values) of the regressions increases slightly with the inclusion of 
occupation fixed effects. The average returns to higher education are slightly lower 
after controlling for occupations.  
Next we allow for different rates of return to education for different groups of 
workers. Thus we estimate the full model specified in equation (1.10). Table 2.3, 
Panel B, shows that the caste variable in 1983 becomes statistically insignificant once 
we allow for differential educational returns across groups. However for all the other 
years, the coefficient of the caste variable is larger (than in the previous specification 
with σ=0 and ω=0) in magnitude and statistically significant. This implies that even 
after accounting for lower caste and higher caste workers having different returns to 
education, lower caste workers earn 10% lower wages in 1993-94 which reduces to 
3.6% lesser wages than higher caste workers in 1999-00. All the coefficients of 
education x caste variables were negative and statistically significant (not reported in 
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the table) implying that lower castes had lower returns to each level of education than 
higher caste workers.  
Similar results hold for male and female workers as well. The magnitude of 
the male coefficient increases once we allow for differential returns to education 
across genders. The estimate of the wage gap due to gender alone rises from 35.8% to 
49.8% in 1999-00 once we allow for different educational returns. Across the years, 
the coefficients of education x male are statistically significant (not reported in the 
table) for those with secondary and graduate education, but they are negative in 
magnitude implying that female workers get higher returns to these levels of 
education than male workers. However the returns to middle school and higher levels 
of education are falling over the seventeen year period.16 Therefore after controlling 
for all the productive and institutional factors, there is a much lower wage gap 
between low and high caste workers compared to male and female workers. 
2.5.2 Earnings Functions for Each Group of Workers 
Next we analyze the earnings functions for each of the four groups of workers 
for each year. We estimate the equation separately for each group of workers and 
include a caste (male) dummy variable in the gender (caste) equations. The earnings 
function for each group (male, female, low and high castes) is estimated using the 
following regression: 
 ln ik h j ik h j k h j ik h jw Xα β λ γ π ε= + + + + + . (1.11) 
                                                 
16 This can be seen by reading across the row for middle, secondary and graduate school coefficients. Average 
returns to middle school decrease from 0.499 to 0.335, and for college graduates from 1.457 to 1.245 (Table 2.3, 
Panel B). 
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The dependent variable is the natural log of real weekly earnings for each 
individual i in state k in industry h and occupation j. X includes five education dummy 
variables for each level of education completed; interaction terms between education 
variables and age to account for changes in the schooling quality across cohorts; a 
fourth order polynomial in age; marital status and household size. The same 
categories are excluded as detailed above in section 2.5.1. 
Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 present the results for gender and caste groups 
respectively. The earnings regressions in these tables include state, industry, 
occupation and sub-round fixed effects. They also allow for interaction terms between 
education and age. The regressions for male and female workers include a caste 
dummy variable. Notice in Table 2.5, the coefficient of caste is negative and 
statistically significant for male (Panel A) workers while it’s positive and statistically 
significant for female (Panel B) workers. This implies that after controlling for 
productive and institutional factors, lower caste male workers earn lesser than higher 
caste male workers, while lower caste female workers earn more than higher caste 
female workers. The magnitude of the caste coefficient changes substantially for 
female workers, indicating a 6.2% wage differential between caste groups in 1983 
which rises to 14.6% in 1993 and falls back to 5.5% in 1999-00. Notice that 
household size coefficients are negative and statistically significant for male workers 
in all years, but it’s statistically significant for female workers only in the second and 
last years.  
The regressions for low and high caste workers include a male dummy 
variable. The male coefficient, in Table 2.6, is positive and significant for both low 
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and higher caste workers. Household size variable is statistically insignificant for 
lower caste (Panel A) workers. The R-squared values for all (except for lower castes) 
the regressions indicate that the demographic and institutional factors account for 
more than 50% of the variation in earnings.  
Table 2.7 and Table 2.8 present the estimates for each group separately when 
we also include interaction terms between education and caste for gender group 
regressions, and interaction terms between education and male for caste groups. In 
Table 2.7, Panel A, we observe that controlling for differences in education between 
castes in examining wages of male workers renders the caste coefficient smaller in 
magnitude and statistically insignificant in 1999. We also observe an increase in the 
returns to higher levels of schooling. In Table 2.7, Panel B, we observe that the caste 
coefficient is still positive and statistically significant for female wage earners. We 
also observe that returns to higher levels of education are falling over time. In Table 
2.8, the male coefficient is larger in magnitude and statistically significant in all the 
years for both low and high caste workers. 
2.6 Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition Results 
Having found that the male and caste coefficients are statistically significant, 
we present the results for the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of the wage gap between 
male and female workers and between low and high caste workers in Table 2.9 and 
Table 2.10 respectively. As mentioned earlier, several reference groups can serve as 
the case where there is no discrimination. We present results based on the higher-
income groups (males and higher castes) being considered the no-discrimination case 
(thus assuming that females and lower castes get paid less, rather than assuming 
 
 38  
nepotism favoring men and higher castes) and the pooled wage structure suggested by 
Neumark (1988). 
2.6.1 Decomposition Results for Gender Groups 
Table 2.9, Panel A, presents the wage gap between male and female workers 
and the explained and unexplained components of this gap, assuming males to be the 
reference no-discrimination group. We also present the standard errors of these 
components. The regressions used to determine the wage gap controls for state, 
industry and occupation fixed effects. We use the entire sample of Hindu workers and 
include a caste dummy variable. We also include household size and a dummy 
variable for being married to control for the selection bias. Only two components 
(education and occupation) of the explained part of the wage gap are presented for the 
sake of brevity. The log wage gap in the second column equals the sum of the total 
explained and unexplained parts in the fourth and seventh columns. The second 
column shows that the log wage gap has fallen substantially over time from 0.825 to 
0.55 between 1983 and 1999-00. We also observe that the extent of the wage gap that 
was explained (unexplained) declined (increased) in 1987-88 and 1993-94, but 
increased by 1999-00.17 Based on the male reference group estimates, about 55% of 
the wage gap in 1999 is unexplained by differences in productive characteristics and 
endowments between men and women. We can also observe that education is a 
significant part of the explained component. Note also that all the estimates are 
statistically significant at the 1% level.  
                                                 
17 The explained component was 37%, 35%, 26.6% and 45.5% of the total wage gap in 1983, 1987-88, 1993-84 
and 1999-00 respectively.  
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 Table 2.9, Panel B, presents the wage gap using a weighted average of the 
male and female wage structures. The trends remain the same with an increased share 
of the wage gap explained in 1999 relative to 1983. The explained component is 
slightly larger and the contribution of the education component in the explained part 
increases slightly in all the years. Based on the pooled-weighted estimates, 50% of 
the wage gap is unexplained by differences in productive characteristics between men 
and women. All the estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level. We also 
decomposed the wage gap based on the female wage structure (not reported here) as 
the reference no-discrimination group (it assumes nepotism favoring males). It 
resulted in similar but slightly lower estimates of the explained components than the 
case assuming that the male wage structure was at the competitive levels.  
2.6.2 Decomposition Results for Caste Groups 
Table 2.10, Panel A, presents the wage gap between low and high caste 
workers and the explained and unexplained components of this gap, assuming higher 
caste workers to be the reference no-discrimination group. We use the entire sample 
of Hindu workers and include a gender dummy variable. We also include household 
size and a dummy variable for being married to control for the selection bias. We 
observe that the wage gap between castes is smaller than between male and female 
workers (as was also indicated by the smaller coefficients on the caste dummy 
compared to the male dummy in the earnings regressions). The wage gap increases in 
1987-88 and decreases slowly by 1999-00, but ends up slightly higher than the wage 
gap in 1983. However, most of the wage gap (almost 95%) is explained by the 
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differences in productive characteristics between workers. The unexplained 
component is not statistically significant in 1987 and 1993. 
Table 2.10, Panel B, presents the wage gap using weights from the pooled 
model. The trends and magnitudes of the estimates are similar to those based on the 
higher-caste reference group. The magnitude of the wage gap between low and high 
caste workers is larger than previous estimates for the city of Delhi by Banerjee and 
Knight (1985). The main difference however is that most of the wage gap, in these 
estimates, is explained by differences in characteristics between low and high caste 
workers, while Banerjee and Knight had found larger unexplained components. We 
also decomposed the wage gap based on the lower caste wage structure (not reported 
here) as the reference no-discrimination group (assumes nepotism favoring higher 
castes). We get similar but slightly lower estimates of the explained components than 
in the case assuming that the high-caste wage structure was at the competitive levels. 
2.7 Occupational Attainment Decomposition 
Having obtained results that show the existence of ‘unexplained’ differences 
in wages, we go on to a model of occupational attainment which tries to examine if 
there is any discrimination in terms of which occupation one might be forced to take 
up and hence have ‘crowding into certain occupations’ (Bergmann, 1971) for lower 
castes based on pre-labor market discrimination. We examine the occupational 
distribution of workers and whether there is a difference in the occupational 
attainment between male and female workers which can explain the continuing wage 
gap based on the technique developed by Brown et al. (1980).  
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There might be differences in characteristics that stem from differential access 
to resources before entering the labor market. Then the differences in characteristics 
would themselves be influenced by discrimination, in which case one would have 
understated the true extent of discrimination. The occupational attainment model is 
based on predicting the occupational distribution of one group assuming that it is 
determined in the same way as that of members of the other group (that is, lower 
caste workers choose occupations just like higher caste workers, and female workers 
choose occupations just like male workers), and involves estimation of within-
occupation earnings functions.  
Multinomial logistic regressions are used to predict the occupational 
distribution of one group assuming they chose occupations as if they were members 
of the other group. The multinomial logistic regression is first run for one group. The 
dependent variable is occupation which is re-defined into six categories based on 
Banerjee and Knight (1985).18  The independent variables are age, education, marital 
status, household size; state, industry and sub-round dummy variables. Employing 
these multinomial logistic estimates, predicted distributions for the other group of 
workers of belonging to these six occupations are obtained. The predicted 
probabilities are used as the sjp̂ values, which show the proportion of scheduled caste 
workers who would be in occupation j if scheduled castes (SCs) faced the same 
occupational structure as the non-scheduled castes (non-SCs). Predicted probabilities 
are similarly calculated for female workers relative to male workers. This is used to 
predict what the occupational pattern of lower caste (female) workers would have 
                                                 
18 The six occupations are: skilled, professional, clerical, production, unskilled and service.  
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been in the absence of any pre-labor market discrimination against them. This 
exercise could also be done assuming that everyone is making occupational choices 
as if they were lower caste (female) workers. 
It is assumed that Pn = nP̂ , since this means that occupational choices of 
higher caste (male) workers are not subject to discrimination, and their probability of 
choosing an occupation is the same as is observed in reality and therefore in the 
sample; while the lower caste (female) workers might exhibit occupational choices 
different in reality ( scP ) than what they might have ( scP̂ ) ended up with if they were 
allowed to choose occupations freely just like the higher caste (male) workers. The 
explained part of occupational distributions is therefore Pn - scP̂  since it incorporates 
actual occupational distributions of non-SCs and of SCs if they chose occupations as 
if they faced the same choices as the non-SCs. Thus scP̂ - scP  is the unexplained 
component since it reflects the difference in occupational distribution arising from 
actual choices ( scP ) of lower caste workers being different from what they should 
have been ( scP̂ ) in the absence of discrimination. Similar results are applicable for 
male and female workers. 
Within-occupation earnings regressions are run for each of the six occupations 
with the same independent variables. For each occupational group, the actual earnings 
difference between lower caste (female) and higher caste (male) workers is broken 
down into explained and unexplained parts assuming that everyone is paid like higher 
caste (male) workers in the labor market. Table 2.11 contains notes to interpreting the 
occupation-based decomposition results presented in Table 2.12 to Table 2.19. The 
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decomposition includes explained differences in wages and jobs and the residual 
components which are attributed to discrimination. Standard errors are also reported. 
The format of these tables is based on Banerjee and Knight (1985). 
2.7.1 Occupation-based Decomposition for Gender Groups 
The decompositions are presented for each year in Table 2.12 to Table 2.15. 
We observe a larger proportion of male workers engaged in skilled and clerical jobs 
compared to females. While the proportion of male workers in skilled occupations 
increases over the seventeen year period, the proportion in clerical occupations 
decreases over the same period. In each of these tables, Column (3) lists the predicted 
occupational distribution of female workers assuming that they choose occupations in 
a manner similar to male workers. Column (5) shows the observed difference in the 
occupational attainments between male and female workers with higher proportions 
of females in professional, service and production jobs and a higher proportion of 
males in skilled, clerical and unskilled jobs. We can divide this observed difference in 
occupational distributions in column (5) into two parts as presented in the next two 
columns. Column (6) represents the part of this difference in occupational distribution 
that is explained, that is, the difference between the predicted occupational 
distributions of women assuming they choose occupations based on the same 
considerations as men, and the actual occupational distribution of men. Column (7) 
on the other hand represents the part of the difference in occupational distribution 
between the predicted and actual occupational distribution of females. A positive 
number in column (7) implies that the actual proportion of women in the 
corresponding occupation is greater than if they had chosen subject to a male 
 
 44  
preference structure. A negative number in column (7) however indicates that the 
proportion of females is less in the corresponding occupation than what would have 
been in females could choose occupations like men. We observe negative numbers in 
column (7) for professional and service workers in all the four years. This implies that 
the proportion of females in professional and services would be higher if females 
could choose occupations based on the male occupational-choice structure. This may 
be due to differences in educational qualifications between male and female workers, 
or other barriers (say social norms) which preclude women from certain occupations. 
In some years, there are negative numbers in column (7) for production workers as 
well; implying that the actual proportion of females in production would have been 
higher if there were no difference between the occupational-choice structures of men 
and women.  
Column (8) presents the actual average wage gap between male and female 
workers in each occupation. We observe that the wage gap is always positive, 
implying that females earn less than men, and the largest wage gaps are mostly in 
skilled, service and production jobs. This wage gap can be decomposed into 
explained and unexplained components as is done in columns (9) and (10) 
respectively. The occupational attainment model further decomposes the explained 
and unexplained components into wage and occupational components.  
Column (11) presents the explained part of the difference in wages within 
occupations and the column total is denoted WE. Column (12) presents the 
unexplained part of the wage gap within occupations and the column total is denoted 
WD. Column (13) presents the difference in qualifications between males and 
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females for a job, and therefore is the explained part of job differences and the 
column total is denoted JE. Column (14) presents the part of the wage gap due to 
differences in occupational structure between the two groups of workers and the 
column total is denoted JD. Therefore WE and JE are the explained components and 
WD and JD are the unexplained components of the wage gap between male and 
female workers. 
 We find that the job discrimination component is negative and 
statistically insignificant, in all the years, implying that the difference in wages 
(across occupations) caused by differences in occupational choice structures between 
men and women is not significant. The explained part of job differences is also 
statistically insignificant in all the four years. However the within-occupation 
components are both statistically significant in all the years. We find that the 
unexplained wage differences (WD in column 12) are quite large and greater in 
magnitude than all the other components. All the within-occupation wage 
discrimination components are statistically significant. We also notice that the 
magnitude of this within-occupation discrimination component reduces over the 
seventeen year period under study. While wage discrimination within occupations 
remains the primary reason for wage gaps between male and female workers, the 
extent of wage discrimination and the wage gap itself is reducing over time. 
2.7.2 Occupation-based Decomposition for Caste Groups 
Results for caste groups are presented in Table 2.16 to Table 2.19. We observe 
in column (5) that a larger proportion of lower caste workers are in service and 
unskilled jobs. Column (7) shows the residual difference between actual and 
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predicted occupational distributions of lower caste workers. The negative numbers for 
service and unskilled occupations imply that the actual proportion of lower caste 
workers in these occupations is larger than the predicted proportions based on higher 
caste occupational choice structure. Columns (11) through (14) decompose the wage 
gap between low and high caste workers into explained and unexplained components. 
We find that the explained job difference and explained wage difference 
components are the larger components in all the four years for caste workers. 
However explained and unexplained components of occupational differences are 
statistically insignificant. We also notice that the magnitude of wage discrimination is 
much smaller than for gender groups, and is declining over time. Wage discrimination 
reduces from about 22% in 1983 to 10% of the wage gap in 1999. Therefore most of 
the wage gap for caste workers is explained by explained wage differences, that is, 
differences in productive characteristics such as education and experience. Barriers to 
certain occupations (reflected in the job discrimination component) are found to be 
unimportant for both gender and caste groups, though the magnitude of this 
component is larger for caste groups.  
2.8 Conclusion 
The wage decomposition exercise we undertook in this analysis has shed new 
light on understanding the reasons for the existence of wage gaps. We can think of 
several reasons for wage gaps between groups, for example differences in their 
abilities and productivity; differences in occupations; geographic variations; 
efficiency wages; or even discrimination. While differences in ability are hard to 
capture, we control for differences in education and age to account for some of the 
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productive characteristics of individuals. We find that even after controlling for all 
observable individual characteristics, and state, industry and occupational differences, 
there still exists a wage gap. Even if the entire unexplained component cannot be 
attributed to discrimination, we do have evidence of unexplained wage gaps.19  
The results from Blinder-Oaxaca (1973) decomposition analyses show that 
unexplained wages are much more important in explaining wage gaps between male 
and female workers than between low and high caste workers. Almost half the wage 
gap between male and female workers is unexplained even after controlling for 
occupations, industries, workers’ and jobs’ characteristics. 
We re-examine the wage gap by considering the possibility that occupational 
differences may not be completely voluntary. It might be that females or lower caste 
workers have lesser access to education or training programs that would allow them 
to join certain occupations. In this scenario the Blinder technique underestimates the 
unexplained wage difference. Brown et al. (1980) have developed the strategy to 
examine wage differences particularly with reference to differences in occupational 
attainment. That is, their strategy assumes that certain groups (say, females) might 
have been subject to pre-labor market discrimination. To correct this, they estimate a 
predicted occupational distribution for the discriminated-against group. They also 
decompose the total wage gap between groups into components explained and 
unexplained by wage and occupational differences. The occupation-based 
decomposition analyses show that the differences in occupational attainment are not 
statistically significant, and wage discrimination is the primary cause of wage gaps 
                                                 
19 This is especially true in light of our restricted list of individual characteristics, in particular the absence of any 
proxy or instrument variable of ability. 
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for female and male workers, while most of the wage gap is explained for low and 
high caste workers. 
  While one might have expected that wage discrimination in India is largely 
influenced by limited access of minorities to certain occupations, given that they have 
lower levels of education and face greater social barriers, it turns out that 
discrimination in access to occupations has a smaller final impact on wages than 
discrimination in wages within the same occupation. This aspect of discrimination in 
the Indian labor market is particularly important for female workers. We conclude 
that within-occupation discrimination in India is particularly important for women 
and not so important for lower castes, while discrimination in access to occupations is 
not statistically significant for any of the groups.  
These results could explain the effect of the government policies and 
programs on the extent of discrimination since the previous study in this field by 
Banerjee and Knight (1985).20 In particular it is some respite that access to 
occupations itself is no longer a significant factor. Part of this may be explained by 
the affirmative action programs, some of which include providing subsidized 
schooling and higher education, and coaching to prepare for entrance exams, besides 
reservations in government sector jobs for lower castes. These wage decomposition 
results indicate that for those who do manage to get the education, there are clearly 
fewer hurdles in accessing jobs. The Blinder decomposition results suggest that we 
need to re-examine policy with respect to improving productive characteristics since 
                                                 
20 Banerjee and Knight had found that there was both wage and job discrimination and wage discrimination was 
larger in magnitude) in the Delhi labor market.  
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almost half the wage gap is due to explained differences in educational and other 
productive characteristics.  
The results for caste groups are consistent with implications of the affirmative 
action model (Coate and Loury, 1993). They establish that in the scenario where 
affirmative action programs on the part of the government require employers to 
ensure equal rates of promotions for members of the disadvantaged group (B) and 
others, there might also be a case of employers patronizing members of the 
disadvantaged group. If employers feel that B workers are not likely to be qualified, 
they might lower the standards required to meet the promotion requirements in order 
to satisfy the affirmative action policy requirement. Then B workers would invest 
lesser in human capital since they can now achieve promotions with lower standards. 
This results in lower productive characteristics for B workers as a result of employer 
patronization and therefore results in a self-fulfilling prophecy of disadvantaged 
workers being less qualified. In the Indian scenario, there are provisions as part of the 
affirmative action policies in favor of scheduled castes that allow for employer 
discretion in lowering qualification requirements for jobs where they feel that enough 
members of the SC group don't qualify under the regular conditions. Thus our results 
that almost all the wage gap between low and high caste workers being explained by 
differences in productive characteristics is consistent with Coate and Loury's 
prediction that members of the disadvantaged group will end up choosing to invest 
lesser in human capital. 
There were significant changes in policy over the period being studied. Most 
of the 1980s were a period of industrial controls and regulation in India with pro-big 
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business policies being the primary emphasis of the government. There was a change 
in power in 1989 to a more pro-labor government, and simultaneous change in 
reservation policies as well, with an extension of reservation to more groups of 
backward castes (and not just those which were originally listed in the Constitution 
under Scheduled Castes). Furthermore, in mid-1991, following a foreign exchange 
crisis, India adopted several wide-ranging reforms in keeping with a Stand-by 
agreement with the IMF. As part of these reforms there was significant liberalization 
on the industrial and trade front which increased competition. We examine the role of 
this potential factor in influencing the decrease in wage gaps of these groups in the 
next chapter. Since almost half the wage gap between male and female workers is 
unexplained by differences in productive characteristics, Chapter 3 focuses primarily 
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Chapter 3 The Impact of Trade Liberalization on Gender 
and Caste Groups in India 
3.1 Introduction 
The analysis in this chapter uses changes in trade policies in India, beginning 
in 1991, to test the effect of the resulting increase in competition on wage gaps 
between different groups. While wage gaps can be generated by several factors, one 
of the factors examined in the literature in India is discrimination. Taste based 
theories of discrimination (Becker, 1957) predict that increased competition should 
reduce the scope for discrimination, since discriminating firms don’t employ inputs 
efficiently. We use the trade liberalizing reforms implemented by means of lower 
tariff and non-tariff barriers as an exogenous increase in competition and evaluate its 
impact on relative wages of females and lower caste workers. We find that industries 
that experienced larger reductions in trade barriers experienced a proportionately 
higher reduction in the wage differential between men and women. The wage 
differential between low and high caste workers however wasn’t significantly 
affected by trade liberalization. 
Discrimination models include neoclassical models like Becker’s (1957) 
model of taste based discrimination and statistical discrimination models proposed by 
Phelps (1972) and Arrow (1972). Taste-based discrimination models assume that 
some agents dislike working with certain others and therefore are willing to pay a 
premium to avoid contact with disliked factors. For example, employers who dislike 
certain workers are willing to lose profits and not employ such workers, or employ 
them only at a lower wage than other workers. The statistical discrimination model 
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assumes that information about individuals is inadequate and therefore commonly 
known characteristics of the group they belong to may be used to infer information 
about individuals.  
Becker’s model predicts that as the economy becomes more competitive, 
employer discrimination should decline since rents that are implicitly used to ‘pay’ 
for a firm’s discriminatory behavior are reduced. In the long run, with free entry and 
zero profits, the existence of potential non-discriminating firms implies that 
discrimination should not be sustainable in equilibrium. If some of the labor market 
discrimination in India is taste-based employer discrimination, then we should see a 
decline in discrimination as competition increases. Higher caste employers may 
dislike hiring lower caste workers, and male employers may dislike hiring female 
employees to conform to social norms.21 It is plausible that there exists taste-based 
employer discrimination in the Indian labor market. We examine if the long-run 
(increased competition) implications of Becker’s theory of employer discrimination 
are validated in the Indian case. The key to testing Becker’s theory is to find instances 
of increases in competition in the Indian economy. Trade reforms of 1991 provide 
such an instance. The underlying premise is that trade reforms increase domestic 
competition and therefore create pressures on all employers to set wages 
competitively and to employ factors of production efficiently. 
                                                 
21 In India, traditional Hindu society divided people into social classes based on the caste system. A person’s caste 
identifies his social and economic status. Traditionally lower castes were restricted to menial jobs and their 
presence was considered to defile a higher caste person. While the caste system was abolished after independence, 
it continues to play an important role in modern Indian society. Women on the other hand have traditionally been 
restricted to remaining outside the formal labor market. It is considered a taboo if women have to work to 
supplement household income. This perception has been changing and probably more so in urban areas.  
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Trade reforms were undertaken in India in the face of a foreign exchange 
crisis. But the reforms faced opposition from several fronts which feared that opening 
the economy would worsen inequality. Given the debate on advantages and 
drawbacks of the reforms, it is also an important policy exercise to examine the 
impact of the reforms on wages. Studies have examined the effect of trade reforms in 
India on wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers (Banga, 2005); 
poverty (Topalova, 2005); and industry wage premiums (Mishra and Kumar, 2005). 
Existing studies provide mixed evidence of the effect of trade reforms.  Assuming 
that one of the reasons for wage gaps between groups is the existence of taste-based 
discrimination by employers, the increased competition brought by the reforms 
should reduce the wage gap. Particularly, the extent of the reduction in the wage gap 
should vary according to the change in the degree of competition. Therefore, larger 
effects on the wage gap should be seen in sectors that experienced larger reductions in 
tariff protection and were relatively more concentrated before the reforms.  
We contribute to the empirical literature on testing the neo-classical theory of 
discrimination. Black and Brainerd (2004) found statistically significant reductions in 
the residual gender wage gap as a result of increased competitiveness in previously 
more concentrated sectors in the United States. However, Berik et al. (2003) found 
increases in the gender wage gap in more concentrated sectors that were opened up to 
greater competition in Taiwan and South Korea. Artecona and Cunnigham (2002) did 
not find any statistically significant effects in Mexico. By extending the analysis to 
India, we add to the debate on the impact of increased competition on the gender and 
caste wage gaps.  
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We examine the impact of the reforms on wages of female relative to male 
workers, and lower caste relative to higher caste workers. While results from Chapter 
2 indicate that wage gaps between low and high caste workers is mostly explained by 
differences in productive characteristics, we explore caste groups to confirm that 
there is no particular effect due to reforms. We use a nationally representative dataset, 
spanning almost two decades, with information on individuals prior to and after the 
reforms. We examine relative wage differentials over time, after accounting for an 
array of productive and demographic factors, as a measure of potential 
discrimination. We use data on tariff and non-tariff trade barriers to ascertain the 
change in the degree of protection offered to each industry. Both types of trade 
barriers were reduced as part of the reforms in 1991. Trade reforms affected both 
manufacturing and agricultural sectors. Information on tariffs is however unavailable 
for agriculture, and therefore we focus our attention on the manufacturing sector. 
Each industry experienced lower protection but the extent of the decrease varied 
based on initial levels of protection. While past studies on discrimination among 
gender and caste groups in India have focused only on specific states or even cities, 
we conduct the analysis for the entire country.  
We find that wage differences between female and male workers were 
reduced more in sectors that experienced larger reductions in the degree of protection. 
On the other hand, individual level results are insignificant for caste groups. We find 
evidence of reductions in wage gaps consistent with Becker’s model for gender 
groups. We find an increase in wages of unskilled women relative to unskilled men in 
the less protected sectors, but there is no statistically significant effect on skilled 
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workers. This is also consistent with predictions of traditional trade theories for an 
unskilled labor abundant country like India. 
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 examines past literature; 
Section 3 describes the conceptual framework; Section 4 describes the data; Section 5 
presents the methodology; Section 6 presents the individual level results; and Section 
7 concludes. 
3.2 Past Literature 
Trade reforms have been a major aspect of development in several countries 
throughout the second half of the twentieth century and numerous studies have been 
devoted to examining the impact of more openness in previously protected 
economies.22 The focus has been on the effects on worker productivity, growth, 
poverty, employment and wages, but evidence is mixed. Theory is ambiguous on 
expected effects on poverty since labor market rigidities might prevent or slow down 
the re-allocation of factors across sectors. Topalova (2005) studied the effect of the 
Indian trade reforms and found an adverse impact on poverty in states with inflexible 
labor regulations, while there was no overall effect on inequality in India as a whole. 
Niimi et al. (2003) examined the growth channel of the effect of trade reforms on 
poverty in Vietnam and found an increase in incomes of the poor employed in certain 
sectors where trade volume rose and prices of tradable goods increased, thereby 
reducing poverty. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004b) who examined the effect on 
employment conditions and wages didn’t find any effect of trade reforms on poverty 
in Colombia.  
                                                 
22 See Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004a) for a detailed review on impact of trade reforms in developing countries. 
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While most of the East Asian economies experienced reduction in wage 
inequalities after trade liberalization, this has not been the case everywhere. Studies 
on Mexico (Feliciano 2001, Harrison and Hanson 1999, Revenga 1997) found 
worsening wage inequalities following trade reforms, with an increase in the relative 
wages of skilled workers. Evidence of skill-biased technical change was found in 
Colombia (Attanasio et al. 2004), in addition to evidence that trade reforms affected 
industry wage premiums, with sectors that became more open experiencing larger 
decreases in wage premiums. Mishra and Kumar (2005) found evidence that reforms 
increased industry wage-premiums in sectors employing relatively more unskilled 
labor, and therefore reduced wage inequality. 
3.2.1 Effect of Trade Reforms on Discrimination 
Literature on the impact of trade reforms has also focused on competitive 
effects expected from neo-classical theories such as Becker’s (1957) model, which 
predicts that competition will force out discriminating employers in the long run. 
Black and Brainerd (2004) analyzed the impact of increased competition via 
increased trade on residual gender wage gaps in concentrated relative to competitive 
industries that were both exposed to trade. Concentrated industries are likely to have 
greater market power, which they can use to sustain discriminatory tastes. Thus an 
increase in competition should generate larger wage gap effects in concentrated 
relative to competitive industries under similar circumstances. They find evidence 
supporting Becker’s theory that discriminating employers find it harder to continue 
being discriminatory as competition increases, with evidence of relative improvement 
in the gender wage gaps in concentrated relative to competitive industries in the US. 
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The studies on effects of trade reforms on gender wage gaps in different 
countries suggests that effects depend on characteristics of the reforms and the initial 
conditions in each country (Fontana et al., 1998). Artecona and Cunnigham (2002) 
examined the effect of trade reforms in the Mexican manufacturing sector on the 
gender wage gap. They didn’t find any statistically significant effect on the gender 
wage gap in non-competitive industries that were exposed to trade reforms but found 
that relative wages increased substantially for skilled workers. Since women are 
mostly unskilled, the gender wage gap is expected to worsen following the reforms. 
They found weakly significant results that gender wage gap fell in industries that 
became more competitive as a result of trade reforms.  
Oostendorp (2002) found evidence that openness is negatively related to the 
gender wage gap within occupational categories in a cross-country study. However, 
evidence to the contrary was found by Berik et al. (2003) in their analysis of Taiwan 
and South Korea. They compared the effects of trade reforms on wage discrimination 
in competitive and non-competitive industries. They found that increasing import 
shares were associated with rising wage discrimination against women in 
concentrated industries, contrary to implications of neoclassical theory. This is partly 
explained by a reduction in female employment in concentrated sectors, and therefore 
in their bargaining power. They inferred that equal pay and opportunity legislation 
needs to be enforced to achieve improvement in female wages. Joekes (1999) reviews 
the literature on effects of trade reforms on gender in different realms, such as 
employment, wages, and greater empowerment within the household.  She observes a 
positive relation between trade expansion and women’s employment and relative 
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wages, with the highest impact in the lowest income countries. See Fontana (2003) 
for a more detailed review of gender effects of trade liberalization. 
3.2.2 Contribution of this Study 
Clearly no generalizations can be drawn on the effects of trade liberalization 
on different groups. Each country produces specific results based on its unique reform 
experience and underlying institutional characteristics and resource endowments. 
While there were no significant effects on the gender wage gap in Mexico (Artecona 
and Cunningham, 2002), there were negative effects in Korea and Taiwan (Berik et 
al., 2003). Manufacturing sector reforms in these countries, for example, generated 
outcomes based on different channels. While the skill-premium increased in Mexico, 
females lost employment and bargaining power in Taiwan and Korea.  
Our analysis in this chapter adds to the current empirical literature on the 
effects of trade reforms by extending the analysis to testing the neo-classical theory 
for India, and specifically examines the impact on gender and caste groups. It is 
plausible that taste-based employer discrimination exists in India against female and 
lower caste workers based on social norms. The caste system has been the basis of 
studies of discrimination, but not the focus of trade-reforms related studies, which this 
analysis aims to test directly. We use individual level data along with information on 
trade statistics that serve to identify the degree of openness of a sector, to examine the 
impact of increased competition, via more openness, on wage inequalities for gender 
and caste groups. Our analysis also contributes to the current policy debate on the 
effect of increased openness on the Indian economy since we find an improvement in 
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the relative wages of female workers in sectors that became more open as a result of 
the trade reforms. 
3.3 Conceptual Framework 
The primary reason for wage differences between groups is the difference in 
observable characteristics like educational attainment, years of work experience, 
training and occupational characteristics. Previous studies (Sambamoorthi, 1984; 
Banerjee and Knight, 1985) and our analysis in the previous chapter have found that 
even after controlling for differences in observable productive characteristics such as 
education and experience, much of the wage gap is still unexplained.  
The strategy we use in this study is to test the implication of Becker’s theory 
of discrimination. Becker’s model predicts that as the economy becomes more 
competitive employer discrimination should decline, subject to constant returns 
production technology, absence of nepotism and government intervention. Since there 
are neither perfectly competitive labor markets, nor instances without government 
interventions in markets, it is hard to test this prediction. It may be more reasonable to 
test for a negative relation between competition and discrimination (Gersen, 2004). 
This would be best tested where one can identify a change in the degree of 
competition and the corresponding change in discrimination. Trade reforms of 1991 
provide such an instance of an increase in competition affecting the manufacturing 
sector of the economy. Taste-based discrimination in India is plausible if higher caste 
employers dislike hiring lower caste workers and male employers dislike hiring 
female employees to conform to social norms. As mentioned earlier, results from 
Chapter 2 imply that much of the wage gap between low and high caste workers is 
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explained by productivity differences, and therefore imply lesser evidence of taste-
based discrimination by higher caste employers. We however check the case of caste 
workers to verify that this is indeed the case.  
It is generally believed that increasing international competition in a 
previously protected economy will force the domestic producers to become more 
competitive. Levinsohn (1993) terms this imports-as-market-discipline hypothesis. 
The hypothesis assumes that firms are technically efficient and predicts that price-
marginal cost mark-ups for previously imperfectly competitive firms will fall as a 
result of trade liberalization via lower tariffs and quotas. Several formal trade theories 
provide different implications of an economy opening to trade subject to different 
conditions pertaining to factor mobility, resource endowments, etc. While there are 
conflicting theories on the impact of more openness, the underlying premise in this 
study is that trade reforms increase domestic competition and therefore create 
pressures on all employers to set wages competitively.23 
We use individual level data to obtain wage and employment information 
which is combined with information on trade barriers to ascertain the change in the 
degree of competition faced by each manufacturing sector. Assuming that one of the 
reasons for wage gaps between groups is the existence of taste-based discrimination 
by employers, it is expected that the increase in competition will reduce the wage gap. 
In this analysis, we assume that there already exists a wage gap between groups and 
test for an improvement in relative wages between groups. The extent of the decrease 
                                                 
23Aghion and Howitt (“Endogenous Growth Theory”, 1998, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press) discuss the 
possibility that openness in the international arena may not always lead to growth and development in a country 
unless accompanied by knowledge accumulation and institutions that provide incentives for technological 
innovations (Betancourt and Seiglie, 1999).   
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in the wage gap would vary according to the change in the degree of competition. We 
expect larger effects on the wage gap in a sector that experiences larger reductions in 
tariff protection, and therefore experiences a larger increase in competition relative to 
other sectors. We find evidence consistent with this expectation for gender groups. 
3.4 Data 
3.4.1 Individual Level Data 
The individual level data comes from the Employment and Unemployment 
Survey (Schedule 10) of the NSSO (National Sample Survey Organization) of the 
Government of India. The data is described in detail in Chapter 2, Section 2.3. Data is 
available for the years 1983, 1987-88, 1993-94 and 1999-2000. Thus it covers periods 
both before and after the 1991 reforms. The data are available as a time-series of 
cross-sections of households.   
The analysis is restricted to the urban sector, which has more reliable data on 
wages and more individuals in the manufacturing sector than rural areas. The tariffs 
were relaxed for the manufacturing sector industries post-1991 as part of the reforms. 
The analysis is however restricted to 72 (of 200) 3-digit manufacturing sector 
industries for which information on tariff and non-tariff barriers is available. The 
analysis is restricted to employed individuals in the age group of 15 to 65 years. The 
analysis is further restricted to 16 States which are typically covered in studies on 
India. The omitted States are in north-east India, where frequent insurgency problems 
may have affected data collection. Topalova (2005) reports that there is evidence of 
very little mobility among workers and that there are no significant spikes in 
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migration post-reforms. This also limits the scope for unobserved changes in the 
composition of the population. The list of States is available in the Data Appendix.  
Wages, reported in the survey as weekly earnings, have been converted to 
constant rupee terms using consumer price indices from the International Financial 
Statistics. The top and bottom 1% of wages are trimmed to omit outliers. Education 
variables are defined as dummy variables for each level of education completed. 
There are 10 education categories: those not literate (notlit); literate but with no 
formal education (noformal); those with below primary education (belowpr); 
completed primary schooling (pr); completed middle school (mid); completed 
secondary school (sec); graduate with agricultural degree (agrigr); engineering 
graduate (engr); medicine graduate (medgr); graduate in other subjects (othergrad). 
The omitted category is notlit. Age variables are included as a fourth order 
polynomial. Marital status is a dummy that equals one for those currently married 
and is zero otherwise. Household head equals one if the individual is the head of the 
household, and zero otherwise. Information on social group identifies whether the 
individual belongs to a scheduled caste. Scheduled Castes form about 17% of the 
population. Information on household religion identifies whether the individual is a 
Muslim. Muslims are the second largest majority and comprise about 13% of the 
Indian population. The results presented here omit Muslims to distinguish effects 
more clearly for gender and caste groups without further confounding effects on 
females between Muslims and others. Therefore we restrict the analysis to Hindus.  
Summary statistics for individuals employed in the 72 manufacturing 
industries are presented in Table 3.1. Summary statistics reveal that women on 
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average earn significantly less than male workers, and the average relative wage ratio 
improved from 0.27 to 0.33 over the time period under analysis. Female workers are 
also younger, and less educated than the male workers. Lower caste workers in fact 
have higher earnings than females. The relative wage ratio of lower castes to higher 
caste workers improved from 0.76 to 0.83 over the entire period. Lower caste and 
female workers have lower levels of education than their counterparts, but there is 
improvement over time for all the groups. The numbers also indicate the educational 
achievements by caste and gender. We observe that the educational levels completed 
have improved for each group between 1983 and 1999-2000. 
Detailed information is available on the activity status of individuals, who can 
be self-employed, in salaried employment, or seeking work. Information is also 
available on the occupation within each industry, and this is used to construct 
occupation categories based on Banerjee and Knight’s (1985) analysis. Individuals 
are classified into six occupations, namely professional, skilled, clerical, service, 
unskilled, and production. Occupation dummies are included in some of the 
regression specifications and the omitted category is skilled workers. The industry 
classification is given by the National Industrial Classification (NIC) of the 
Government of India. Concordance tables were used to convert all the industry codes 
into their NIC-87 equivalents. The list of the 72 three-digit manufacturing industries 
is provided in the Data Appendix.  
3.4.2 Trade Data 
Tariff data is obtained from Das (2003). Das computes the Corden measure of 
the effective rate of protection (ERP) for 72 3-digit Indian manufacturing industries, 
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for the four phases 1980-81 to 1985-86, 1986-87 to 1990-91, 1991-92 to 1994-95, and 
1995-96 to 1999-00. He also calculates the import coverage ratio and the import 
penetration rate for these industries for the same period.  
The Corden measure of effective rate of protection equals the percentage 
excess of domestic value added over foreign value added, due to tariffs, which Das 
(2003) calculates as follows: 
ERPj = (VA*j – VAj) / VAj.     (1.12) 
VA*j is the value added at free trade prices, and VAj is value added at tariff distorted 
prices for final product j.24 The effective rate of protection measures the protection to 
domestic factors of production based on tariffs on both input prices and output prices, 
and thus is a better measure than the nominal rate of protection which doesn’t account 
for tariffs on inputs. Higher ERP therefore imply higher degree of protection. It must 
be noted however that in a country like India, which relied heavily on quantitative 
restrictions (and other non-tariff barriers) in addition to high tariffs, the effective rate 
of protection alone might not give a complete picture of the degree of protection. 
The import coverage ratio (ICR) is a measure of the frequency of non-tariff 
barriers (NTBs) weighted by imports or by production. Das (2003) defines the Import 
Coverage Ratio as Ci = ∑ DiMi / ∑ Mi, where j is industry and i is a particular product 
line within an industry; Di is a dummy variable which equals one if the product is 
listed under restricted (or banned/limited permissible/canalized) imports, and zero if 
                                                 
24 The value added functions are defined as VAj = (1-∑aij) and VA*j = (1+tj) - ∑(1+aij), such that 
ERP can be expressed as ERPj = (Tj - ∑aijTi) / (1 - ∑aij), where j is the j’th activity or product, Tj is 
the nominal tariff rate for j’th product, Ti (i=1,2,…,n) are the nominal tariff rates of tradable 
intermediate inputs used in the j’th activity, aij (i=1,2,…,n) are the cost shares of inputs in production 
of j’th activity, ∑aij is sum of shares of intermediate inputs in the final value of j, and is a weighted 
average of input tariffs on all intermediate inputs with weights according to input shares (Das, 2003). 
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the product is on the open general list (and is freely importable); Mi is the value of 
imports of the ith product category which is subject to NTBs; and ∑Mi is the sum of 
the value of imports of all the product lines within the industry. The change in the 
import coverage ratio gives some idea of the trend in NTBs, but does not capture the 
exact price advantage to domestic producers from such protection. Higher import 
coverage ratio indicates greater protection.  
The import penetration rate (IPR) measures the combined effect of both 
tools of protection, namely tariffs and NTBs. It is expected that lower tariffs along 
with lower NTBs (for example more items shifted from the restricted list to the open 
general list) will raise imports and vice-versa. The import penetration rate is defined 
as the ratio of industry imports to domestic availability, where domestic availability is 
defined as domestic production plus imports minus exports. Exports and imports of 
product lines are aggregated to obtain the industry levels. Das (2003) defined the 
import penetration rate as MPRj = Mj / (Pj + Mj – Xj), where j is industry; P is 
domestic production; M is imports; and X is exports. Higher import penetration rates 
imply lower levels of protection. 
Summary statistics of trade measures are presented in Table 3.2. Trends in 
ERP in 1983 and 1999 are shown in Figure 2. The summary statistics reflect 
substantial declines in both tariffs and non-tariff barriers. The average effective rate 
of protection declined from 115% to about 40% over the period under analysis, and 
the average import coverage ratio declined from 97% to 25%.  While in the first 
phase, nearly 70% of industries had ERP in the range of 50 to 150%, in the last phase 
of reforms, almost 80% of the industries had tariffs in the range of 0 to 50%, and 
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none of the industries had tariffs above 100%. Almost 92% of industries had 100% 
import restrictions in the first phase, which declined to 5 industries in the last phase. 
There weren’t large changes in the import penetration rate (Das, 2003).  
3.4.3 Annual Survey of Industries Data 
This dataset obtained from publications of the Economic and Political Weekly 
in India is used to get information on the number of firms, and the gross fixed capital 
formation for each industry. The number of firms is used to generate a measure of 
industrial concentration to account for changes other than changes in trade protection 
levels for each industry. The results presented are based on using the percentage 
change in the number of firms between 1983 and 1999 relative to 1983 as the measure 
of change in industry concentration. The gross fixed capital formation provides 
information on all the new physical investments in an industry and is used to control 
for changes in terms of foreign direct investments and increased domestic 
investments as a result of trade reforms and industrial de-regulation. Data is available 
at the 3-digit industry level, which is the level of aggregation of the trade data as well.  
3.5 Methodology 
Focusing on employer discrimination, Becker’s model implies that 
discriminating employers earn lower profits than non-discriminating employers, 
which cannot be sustained in the long run under perfect competition. Thus perfect 
competition in the long run would eliminate employer discrimination.25  
                                                 
25 Customer and employee discrimination can however persist in the long run.  
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Trade liberalization in India in 1991 provides an instance of a significant 
change in the level of competition in the economy. It is therefore expected that firms 
that could indulge their preferences pre-reforms when trade protection allowed super-
normal profits may be unable to continue doing so once competition eliminates those 
profits. The trade reforms are used to test the impact on relative wage differentials 
between men and women, and between low and high caste workers. To test for a 
negative relationship between competition and discrimination, we look at the effect 
on individual’s wages in industries that experienced a reduction in tariffs. We expect 
that industries experiencing larger decreases in tariffs, since they become more 
competitive, would see a larger reduction in discrimination, measured in terms of 
relative wage differentials between the groups of interest.  
3.5.1 Individual Level Analysis 
The individual level analysis involves standard Mincerian earnings 
regressions with log of real weekly wages as the dependent variable, demographic 
characteristics (such as gender and caste dummies, age, education, marital status, sex 
of the head of the household, occupation, etc.) and measures of protection in each 
industry. Gender and caste dummy variables indicate whether these groups get higher 
or lower returns than the comparison group. The impact of trade reforms on gender 
(caste) groups is captured by the coefficient on the interaction term between the trade 
protection measure and the female (caste) dummy variable, which is expected to be 
negative. The negative coefficient would indicate that lowered protection raises 
wages of female (lower caste) workers relative to male (higher caste) workers.  
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The main equation used to assess the impact on wages is the following within-
group regression: 
Ln wijtk = α + β(Xijtk) + γ0(Femalei) + γ1(Protectjt) + γ2(Protectjt X Femalei) + λt +  φk + θj + ψjt  
+ εijtk.      (1.13) 
In the above equation, ln wijtk is the natural log of weekly earnings of individual i in 
industry j in time t in state k; X consists of the individual characteristics comprising 
age (in quartic), nine education dummies for each level of education completed, 
marital status (equals one if married and zero otherwise) , and household head 
dummy (equals one if head of household, zero otherwise); Female is a dummy 
variable which equals one if individual is a female and zero otherwise; Protect 
includes the tariff and non-tariff measures of protection of the industry; φ, λ, and 
θ denote state, post-liberalization and industry fixed effects, respectively. The above 
equation which is written for gender groups is extended by adding a caste dummy 
variable and its interaction terms to analyze the effect for caste groups. Since the 
tariff and non-tariff barriers are reported at the industry level, standard errors are 
corrected by clustering at the industry level. The regressions are also weighted using 
sampling-weights.  
By including the female (caste) dummy variable, the method assumes that 
there exist wage differences between these groups. Protection measures indicate the 
overall impact of the change in protection on wages in the economy across groups. 
This method assumes that lower effective rate of protection and import coverage 
ratios, and higher import penetration rates imply increased competition within an 
industry. The negative of the import penetration variable is used to simplify 
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comparison between coefficients. The coefficients of the protection measures are 
expected to be negative if lower protection raises wages.  
The protection measures interacted with female are the main variables of 
interest. The coefficient of protection x female indicates the impact of a change in the 
degree of protection on the relative wages of females across industries. Increased 
competition in the sectors experiencing more openness will cause employers to be 
less discriminatory and therefore females will experience an increase in their wages 
relative to male workers. We expect protection x female to be negative.  
The regression is run for the full sample consisting of males, females, low and 
high caste workers, and also separately for gender and caste groups. The full sample 
is restricted to Hindus to simplify the analysis. In looking at the gender groups alone, 
the sample is restricted to the higher castes, while in examining the caste groups the 
sample is restricted to males.  
Levels of protection vary across industries and over time. Across-industry 
(cross-section) differences in levels of protection indicate the correlation between 
wages and levels of protection, which would also be a function of other 
characteristics of the industry. It would not account for the effect of a change in 
protection within an industry. Since the aim is to analyze the effect of different 
magnitudes of change in protection over time rather than differences in level of 
protection across industries in any one year, industry fixed effects are included to 
focus on within-industry comparisons. While protection levels have changed in each 
of the four years (protection was increased between the first two years of data, and 
decreased after 1991) under analysis, we intend to capture the effect of the trade 
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reforms in 1991. Therefore industry X post-liberalization interaction terms are 
included to account for changes in the post-liberalization period. An interaction term 
Industry x PostLib x Female is also included to account for differential returns to men 
and women of changes in post-reform period across industries. 
3.5.2 Additional Controls 
We include Industry x female and education x protection measures to account 
for differential returns to women workers across industries, and differential effect of 
protection on people with different educational achievements, respectively. We also 
include state fixed effects in the regressions. States in India have significant linguistic 
barriers that make migration across states more difficult.26 While states vary in terms 
of their levels of industrialization, the changes in trade protection were at the 
industrial level and applied uniformly across states. Since labor markets are 
considered to be differentially rigid across states, it is meaningful to include state and 
female (caste) interaction terms to account for different experiences across states. 27 
3.5.3 Limitations 
The analysis here focuses on looking at the wage effect. The labor force 
participation rates of women have not changed much during the entire period under 
study. Thus there need not be concerns that the results obtained are being driven by a 
significant increase in the number of women entering the labor force. It is possible 
                                                 
26 While seasonal migration between states might occur, this is mostly in the rural and agricultural sector than in 
organized manufacturing.  
 
 
27 The results with inclusion of state x female and state x caste are not presented here, but it doesn’t change the 
results much, though the state x female and state x caste coefficients are jointly significant in each set of 
regressions for gender and caste groups respectively. 
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that the impact on employment probabilities of women are more likely than the wage 
impact, but the analysis in this chapter focuses on wages. 
Inclusion of protection measures accounts for differences in degree of 
protection and therefore in the resulting degree of competition across industries. 
However changes in competition between industries because of industrial de-
regulation may bias the estimates by overestimating the impact of lowered trade 
protection. While trade reforms began in mid-1991, industrial de-regulation had 
begun in the late 1980s. Ideally the regression should directly control for changes in 
the industrial structure resulting from de-regulation so that effects of trade reforms 
can be clearly and separately analyzed. The degree of concentration of the domestic 
industry would be a useful measure in this context. The domestic economy would 
become less concentrated over time, both due to de-regulation and due to trade 
liberalization. Unfortunately the data has no direct measure of industrial 
concentration. The percentage change in the number of firms within an industry over 
time is used as a crude measure to capture the change in degree of concentration 
within that industry. Traditional industry concentration measures such as the 
Herfindahl Index and the Concentration Ratio account for market share of each firm. 
While the measure constructed here is not able to capture market share, it is included 
nevertheless to capture changes in industrial structure. While inter-industry 
comparisons wouldn’t be of much use in this case, including this measure would 
nevertheless provide additional information. Weighting the number of firms by 
industry gross value added can enable cross-sectional comparisons across industries, 
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since industry A with fewer firms and higher gross value added than industry B is 
likely to be more concentrated.  
It is possible that political clout of bigger firms in an industry prior to reforms 
in 1991 could have influenced the actual level of tariffs that was fixed for that 
industry.28 Since the reforms were effectively imposed in India as a condition to 
receiving aid from the IMF to avoid a financial crisis, the political influence of 
industries should not influence tariff levels decided as part of the reforms.29 Apart 
from offering protection, the high tariffs were also used to generate revenue. The 
decision regarding which industries continued getting protection was determined on 
the basis of considerations of strategic importance and products which were important 
for mass-consumption, rather than considerations to favor the bigger firms across 
industries. Thus industry-level changes are expected to have been guided by concerns 
of economic policy more than nepotism. The change in the protection levels can 
therefore be considered exogenous and therefore OLS should generate consistent 
estimates. Tariff and non-tariff barriers were reduced across the board for all 
industries and our analysis captures the effect of the difference in the extent of 
decrease in protection across industries.  
                                                 
28 Bertrand (2004) found evidence that increase in foreign competition in the US changed the sensitivity of current 
wages to current unemployment rate, with larger effects in more financially constrained industries. 
 
 
29 The study assumes that political influence of different firms doesn’t affect wage-setting. The public 
(government controlled) sector was pre-dominant in organized sector production and therefore the government 
influenced wage setting not only in the public sector but also in the private sector. Collective bargaining is 
therefore generally believed to be less important than the role of government in wage setting in India. Minimum 
wage laws were imposed in both organized and unorganized sectors. Also, labor laws in India are quite rigid. The 
Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 made it very hard for firms to fire workers, with firms employing more than 100 
workers requiring prior permission, which was seldom granted, from state governments. 
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An improvement in women’s unobserved characteristics could also help 
explain their relative wage increase. But as long as there is no difference in the 
improvement of these characteristics (for example, women stay longer in the labor 
force) across industries or sectors based on the openness of those sectors, it cannot 
explain differences in results across sectors since uniform effects may be expected in 
all sectors. Given the lower social status of women (and lower castes), it is likely that 
the women who choose to enter the labor market are differently advantaged relative 
to those who choose not to work. The analysis should ideally correct for such a 
selection bias, which is part of the extensions we intend in the future.  
3.6 Results based on Individual Level Analysis 
We present the results for the manufacturing sector based on regression 
equation 1.13, for the entire sample and for gender and caste groups separately. The 
sample is restricted to Hindus.  
3.6.1 Results for Entire Sample 
Results are presented in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4. Each column represents a 
separate regression, with the same dependent variable (log of real weekly earnings). 
Starting with the simplest specification in column (1) of Table 3.3, which includes 
demographic characteristics, female and caste dummy variables, explains almost 50% 
of the changes in log weekly earnings. Note that the coefficient of the caste dummy is 
positive and significant in the early specifications. We also run regressions (not 
reported here) similar to the specification in column (1) for skilled and unskilled 
workers (these regressions don’t include education x female and education x caste). 
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Skill groups are defined on the basis of education levels completed. If skilled workers 
are considered to be those with more than high school education (that is, have at least 
some college education), then earnings differentials between females and males are 
statistically significant only for unskilled workers. The coefficients of PostLib and 
PostLib x Female are both positive and statistically significant for unskilled workers 
while they are both insignificant for skilled workers. This provides evidence that 
unskilled female workers benefited post-liberalization. The earnings differential 
between castes is statistically significant only for skilled workers. 
Column (2) of Table 3.3 includes the ERP measure of protection, ERP x caste 
and ERP x female to capture the effect of lowered protection on wages of each group. 
ERP x female and ERP x caste are both statistically significant and negative as 
expected. The magnitude of the effect of lower protection is larger for females 
relative to males, than for lower castes relative to higher castes. The coefficient of 
ERP x female is -0.197 and is -0.05 for ERP x caste, which implies a 1.97% increase 
in relative wages of females, and a 0.5% increase in relative wages of lower castes 
when the ERP is reduced by 10-percentage points.  
Industry fixed effects are included in column (3) to focus on within-industry 
effects. The inclusion of industry fixed effects reduces the magnitude of the effect of 
lower protection slightly for females, while effects on both females and lower castes 
remain statistically significant. Industry x PostLib effects are included to account for 
changes across industries before and after reforms, along with PostLib x Female and 
PostLib x Caste to account for changes affecting the groups differently, before and 
after reforms. The effect of lower protection on caste groups becomes statistically 
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insignificant once PostLib is included, while the effect on females remains 
statistically significant.  
Additional specifications in columns (5)-(8) include Industry x Female, 
Industry x Caste to account for differential returns to groups across industries; and 
Industry x PostLib x Female and Industry x PostLib x Caste to account for returns to 
groups across industries before and after reforms. Occupational dummies as well as 
their interactions with female and caste dummy variables are included in columns (7) 
and (8). Across all the specifications, there is a statistically significant effect of lower 
ERP on relative female wages, but there is no significant effect of lower ERP on 
relative wages of lower caste workers (once PostLib is included). The last column 
includes the import penetration measure, which however doesn’t have a significant 
effect on relative wages of either group, as indicated by coefficients of –IPR x female 
and –IPR x caste.  
Table 3.4 presents additions to specifications in Table 3.3, for the entire 
sample. These specifications include all three measures of protection. Protection x 
PostLib is included in some specifications to account for the overall effects of 
lowered protection before and after liberalization. Table 3.4 also includes the industry 
concentration measure of percentage change in number of firms, and the gross fixed 
capital formation of industries. ERP x education are seen to be mostly jointly 
insignificant. The overall conclusion from all the specifications is that there is a 
significant effect of lowered protection on female relative to male workers, while 
there is no significant effect for lower caste workers.  
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Protection X PostLib X Female captures the effect of lowered protection post-
liberalization for women relative to men. The negative coefficient on this multiple 
interaction term implies improved outcomes for female workers in less protected 
sectors post-reforms. Employers in these sectors may experience greater competitive 
pressures from other sources as well in the post-reform period, one of which may be 
de-regulation of the domestic economy. Protection x PostLib x Female are 
statistically significant using both ERP and IPR measures and plausibly indicates that 
other changes (such as domestic de-regulation) in the economy in the post-
liberalization period had a heightened effect in the less protected industries than 
others. The combined effect of lower protection on female wages relative to male 
wages, in terms of ERP is the sum of the effects on ERP x female and ERP x PostLib 
x female. This equals -0.747 [= -0.182 -0.565], which implies that for a 10-percentage 
point fall in the ERP there is a 7.5% increase in wages of females relative to male 
workers. IPR x PostLib x Female is statistically significant and the combined effect of 
a change in the import penetration rate is -0.292 [= -1.720 + 1.428], which implies 
that for a 10-percentage point increase in the import penetration rate, there is a 2.9% 
increase in the relative wages of female workers. There is however no significant 
effect on lower castes. An interaction term between female and caste dummies is 
included in the last two specifications but was statistically insignificant. The next 
section analyzes the effect on gender groups. 
3.6.2 Results for Gender Groups 
The sample used to analyze the impact on males and females is restricted to 
higher castes to avoid problems of differential impact on these groups across higher 
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and lower castes. Results are presented in Table 3.5, Table 3.6 and Table 3.7. The 
first column of Table 3.5 shows the simplest specification for gender groups. 
Including all demographic characteristics of age, education, marital status, etc. 
explains 47% of variations in log weekly earnings. A female dummy variable is 
included to capture relative differences in earnings between gender groups. The 
coefficient of female is negative and significant and implies 57% lower earnings for 
female relative to male workers. The second column includes the ERP measure of 
protection to capture the effect of lower protection on wages. The coefficient of ERP 
is -0.086 and indicates that a 10-percentage point decrease in the ERP increases 
wages for everyone by 0.8%. Next, industry fixed effects are included in column (3) 
to focus on within-industry variations. This raises the effect of lower protection to a 
1% increase in wages for a 10-percentage point decrease in ERP as reflected by the 
coefficient of ERP (-0.110). We also calculate the impact of lowered protection in 
lowering the female-male wage gap reported in Chapter 2. The actual decrease in the 
female-male wage gap between the pre- and post-liberalization periods is 0.163. We 
use Blinder decomposition technique to determine the impact of lower protection 
post-liberalization measured by change in ERP on the wage gap and find this impact 
to be 0.034. Therefore lowered protection explains about 21% (equals 0.034/0.163) of 
the decrease in the female-male wage gap. 
Since reforms were introduced in 1991, to account for changes pre- and post-
reforms, a PostLib dummy variable is included. While the coefficient of ERP (-0.070) 
is still statistically significant, the magnitude is lower. ERP x female is included next 
in column (5) to account for the differential effect of lower protection on women 
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workers compared to male workers. The coefficient of ERP x female is negative and 
statistically significant and indicates that for a 10-percentage point decline in the 
effective rate of protection, there is a 2% increase in wages of female relative to male 
workers. To account for changes across industries in the post-liberalization period 
compared to the pre-reform period, industry x PostLib is included, which reduces the 
impact of lower protection on relative female wages to 1.67% for a 10 percentage 
point decrease in ERP. When state fixed effects are included (not reported here) to the 
specification in column (6) of Table 3.5, it doesn’t change the magnitude or 
significance of the primary variable of interest, ERP x female. 
Including Other Measures of Protection 
Table 3.6 presents additions to specifications in Table 3.5 that include other 
measures of protection. Column (7) includes only the IPR measure which is 
statistically insignificant, but –IPR x female is significant and negative and implies 
that when the import penetration increases by 10-percentage points, the wages of 
female workers increase by 5.5% compared to wages of male workers. Column (8) 
includes both ERP and IPR measures. The import penetration rate is statistically 
insignificant in all the specifications while the ERP is statistically significant. 
However, ERP x female is mostly insignificant once other measures are included, 
while IPR x female is mostly significant. Thus lower protection through increased 
penetration seems to have a greater effect on relative female earnings than lowered 
tariffs. Industry x female is included since females may be impacted differently across 
industries. The coefficient of negative IPR x female in column (11) is statistically 
significant and indicates that for a 10-percentage point increase in the import 
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penetration rate (which indicates lowered protection) there is about 5% increase in 
relative wages of female workers. The ERP x female coefficient (which is significant 
in this specification) indicates a corresponding 2% increase in relative female wages 
for a change in the ERP. Occupation and occupation x female variables are also 
included. To account for differential impact on men and women post-reforms across 
industries, additional interaction terms industry x PostLib x female are included in the 
last two specifications. The IPR x female coefficient remains significant but is smaller 
and indicates a 4% increase in relative wages of female workers when the import 
penetration rate increases by 10 percentage points. Meanwhile the ERP x female 
coefficient is no longer significant. Percentage change in number of firms; and real 
gross fixed capital formation are included in the last specification to account for 
changes in industry concentration and growth. Inclusion of these industry measures 
make both ERP x female and IPR x female insignificant. 
Table 3.7 presents additional specifications for gender groups. Column (14) 
includes protection x PostLib x female. These multiple interaction terms provide the 
effect of other changes in the economy, which interact with changes in protection, to 
further affect wages. It might be expected that an industry that is de-regulated 
domestically, allowing existing firms to expand and new firms to enter, will 
experience greater increase in competition as a result of trade reforms. The coefficient 
of ERP x female is insignificant in all but the first specification. The coefficient of 
ERP x PostLib x female is significant in all but the first specification and indicates 
that a 10-percentage point fall in the ERP raises relative female wages by more than 
5% in the post-reform period. IPR x female is statistically significant in columns (17), 
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(18) and (19). The last specification includes the third measure of protection, the 
import coverage ratio and interactions similar to those for the other measures, but ICR 
x female and ICR x PostLib x Female are insignificant.  
The percentage change in the number of firms is included in columns (16)-
(19). It is significant, though small and positive across all the specifications. A 
positive coefficient on the concentration variable implies an increase in the wages due 
to increased competition. However, concentration X female and concentration X caste 
were insignificant (results not reported here), which implies that there was no 
differential effect across groups of a change in the degree of concentration of 
industries. The gross fixed capital formation variable is also very small in magnitude 
but positive and weakly significant.  
Potential Explanations 
There can be several explanations for the reduction in the wage gap between 
men and women, for instance higher female educational attainment; occupational 
changes; supply-side changes such as greater commitment to staying on longer in the 
labor force; or even lesser discrimination against females. The educational changes 
are accounted for by including the education dummies.30 When education X PostLib is 
included, IPR X Female is still significant, and education X PostLib variables are 
jointly significant. This accounts for changes in education over time. Education x 
female are jointly significant implying differential returns to education for female 
relative to male workers. Occupation x female is also jointly significant.31 The latter 
significant result points to relative improvements in returns for females within 
                                                 
30 Education is a set of 9 dummy variables. Not literate is the omitted category.  
31 Occupation is a set of 5 dummy variables. Skilled is the omitted category. 
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occupations. Table 3.8 shows the relationship between the percentage of female 
employment by industry and the percentage change in the ERP between the first and 
last year. The figures are presented for 5 industries each, with the highest and lowest 
ERP levels in 1983. There is no systematic relationship between these changes, 
assuring us that the results are not the by-product of women disproportionately 
entering industries where the ERP declined substantially. Thus after having controlled 
for these changes, the significant coefficient of protection x female plausibly indicates 
the actual effect of the increased competition, rather than a spillover from the higher 
educational achievements of women workers, or changes in industrial composition 
over time.   
Several studies have presented evidence on the existence of differential 
returns to gender in India. Sambamoorthi (1984) using data from a city in south India 
found evidence that about 36% of the wage gap between men and women was 
attributable to discrimination. Madheswaran and Lakshmanasamy (1996) found that 
over 98% of occupational disparity between males and females was unexplained (and 
could be due to discrimination by firms, or women’s preferences or both) and that the 
predominant cause of lower female relative wages was within-occupation differences 
rather than disadvantageous occupational distribution of female workers. Our results 
for gender groups are consistent with results from the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition 
of the wage gap into explained and unexplained parts. The decomposition results 
point towards greater relevance of a discrimination-based wage gap story for gender 
rather than caste groups. The wage decomposition numbers had shown that a larger 
part of the wage gap is explained for lower castes than for females relative to higher 
 
 82  
castes and males respectively. This can explain the statistically significant impact of 
lowered protection on potential discrimination against female workers.  
The common association studied between trade reforms and wages operates 
through differential impact on skill groups. Studies [see Banga, 2005; Dutta, 2005] 
examining the impact of trade reforms on wage inequalities between skilled and 
unskilled workers find that wage inequalities have gone up. The educational 
distribution of women is poorer than that of men.32 Even after accounting for such 
differences, there is a significant impact of lowered protection on relative wages of 
female workers.  
For males and females, separate regressions (not reported here) are run for 
those with more than high school education and for those with less than high school 
education, which is the usual basis of defining skilled workers. For those with more 
than high school education (skilled workers), none of the protection X female terms is 
statistically significant, whereas for those with less than high school education 
(unskilled workers), IPR X female is still significant. This implies a beneficial effect of 
lowered protection on the relative wages of females with less than high school 
education, while there is no statistically significant improvement in the relative wages 
of females with more than high school education as a result of higher import 
penetration. This indicates improvements in returns to the less skilled female workers 
which are in keeping with our expectation that in an unskilled labor abundant country 
the returns to unskilled labor should increase if the country has a comparative 
                                                 
32 While about 40% of female workers in the sample are not literate, only 14% of male workers are not literate. 
Those who have completed primary schooling form the second highest proportion of female workers (about 18%), 
while the corresponding group for male workers is those who have completed secondary schooling (about 24%). 
Female graduate workers comprise only 4% of the sample while male graduate workers comprise about 9% of the 
sample. 
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advantage in the production of the unskilled labor intensive good. These results are 
consistent with Mishra and Kumar (2005) findings that unskilled workers (males and 
females) benefited from trade reforms in the urban manufacturing sector.  
3.6.3 Results for Caste Groups 
The sample is restricted to males for this set of regressions. While the caste 
dummy is negative and statistically significant, the interaction terms involving caste 
and other variables are not significant. The results are presented in Table 3.9. The 
results imply that lower castes do not benefit any differently from lowered protection 
than do higher castes. This result is consistent with findings from the decomposition 
of the wage gap into explained and unexplained parts. While wage gaps do exist 
between low and high caste workers, it doesn’t stem from discrimination, rather from 
poorer educational achievements of lower castes. The individual level regressions are 
also run separately for skilled and unskilled workers. While protection x caste was 
insignificant for both groups of workers, protection x caste x postlib was significant 
for skilled workers, indicating that there is a significant effect of lowered protection 
on high skilled low caste relative to high caste workers.  
3.7 Conclusion 
Previous studies have established the evidence of wage gaps between females 
and males and between low and high castes. Even after controlling for all observable 
productive characteristics, the wage gap persists. While the entire wage gap is not 
necessarily due to discrimination, there is evidence of wage discrimination against 
females and lower castes in India. While direct evidence in the labor market on 
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discrimination is scant, there is substantial evidence of its persistence in the social 
realm.33 If some of this is taste-based discrimination on the part of males and higher 
caste employers conforming to social norms, we expect that an increase in 
competition will reduce the extent of employer discrimination by reducing rents. We 
use the trade reforms in India as an exogenous change in the degree of competition in 
the domestic economy to examine the impact of increased competition on wage 
discrimination against female and lower caste workers.  
Using individual level analysis, we find that industries which experience 
greater liberalization (in terms of larger reductions in the protective barriers) 
experience a proportionately higher reduction in the wage differential between 
women and men, but there is no statistically significant impact on wage differentials 
between lower and upper castes. Lower protection in terms of lower tariffs and 
greater import penetration increase the wages of female relative to male workers. The 
result for gender groups is consistent with the implication of Becker’s theory of 
employer discrimination that increased competition should reduce employer 
discrimination. In addition, there is a heightened effect of other changes in the post-
liberalization period on the industries which experience lower protection and 
therefore on relative wages in these sectors. However, the lack of any direct measures 
of concentration in the industrial sector precludes an analysis similar to other studies 
which compare the effect of increased competition across concentrated and less 
concentrated sectors.  
                                                 
33 Betancourt and Gleason (2000) found evidence of unequal treatment of lower castes in allocation of publicly 
provided goods such as health and education in rural areas. Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2003) examined the impact 
of empowering women in rural areas by reserving posts for them in Gram Panchayats (village councils) to 
increase their representation in local governance.  
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After accounting for productive characteristics, we find statistically significant 
wage differentials between unskilled male and female workers, but no significant 
wage differentials between skilled male and female workers. We find an increase in 
wages of unskilled women relative to unskilled men in the less protected sectors, but 
there is no statistically significant effect on skilled workers. This indicates evidence 
of decrease in unskilled worker wage differentials for gender groups, in keeping with 
Becker’s prediction. This result is also consistent with traditional trade theories that 
predict that opening up an unskilled labor abundant country should increase the 
returns to the unskilled labor input if it is used intensively in the good in which the 
country has a comparative advantage. There is mixed evidence on the effect of 
reforms on wage inequality between skill groups in India. Our result is consistent 
with Mishra and Kumar (2005) who used the same data and found evidence of 
improvement in wages of unskilled workers relative to skilled workers. 
Though a priori we expected to find a significant impact of lower protection 
on lower castes, the results are statistically insignificant for lower castes relative to 
higher castes. This might be explained by the fact that the analysis focuses on the 
urban areas where the social stigma of belonging to a lower caste group might be 
lesser than in rural areas. Also, the affirmative action program of reservations for 
lower castes in government jobs has contributed to increased opportunities for lower 
castes in public sector jobs, which might in turn result in their lower numbers in urban 
manufacturing which might explain the insignificant results.  
This result is relevant both as a contribution to the empirical literature on the 
economics of discrimination and as a policy analysis of the economic impacts of trade 
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reforms in India. The empirical literature provided mixed evidence with evidence of 
increased competition leading to a reduction in wage discrimination in the US, while 
studies for developing countries obtained insignificant or sometimes opposite results. 
This result bolsters the argument in favor of Becker’s theory of discrimination. In 
terms of policy analysis, the welfare effects of trade liberalization in India are still 
subject to debate. The result that greater openness has in fact reduced discrimination 
against female workers therefore contributes to an argument in favor of liberalization 
in India.  
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Chapter 4 Conclusion 
The analysis in this dissertation documents the pattern and evolution of 
discrimination against women and lower castes in the Indian labor market over the 
course of almost two decades. It adds to our understanding of the nature of the 
discrimination that prevails against these groups. 
The second chapter conducts an extensive analysis of discrimination in the 
Indian labor market among groups that have traditionally been economically 
disadvantaged. While lower castes have been disadvantaged for centuries due to a 
well-established social hierarchy, women have been disadvantaged due to social 
norms which dictated that it was a taboo for women to be working outside the 
protected environs of her household.  
We examine the wage gaps between male and female workers and between 
low and high caste workers in 16 Indian States over a seventeen year period. We use 
a time-series of cross-sections of nationally representative data on individuals and 
households to analyze these changes. The first step is an earnings regression analysis 
to determine if there is a significant difference in returns between groups that is not 
fully captured by productive characteristics. We include, in the list of productive 
characteristics, dummy variables for each level of education completed; a fourth order 
polynomial in age; allowed for interactions between age and education to control for 
qualitative differences in education across cohorts; include interactions of education 
with caste and male dummy variables to account for differences in educational 
returns across these groups. We also include household size and a marital status 
dummy variable to control for self-selection bias. Among the institutional factors, we 
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include industry, state and occupation fixed effects to control for the main factors we 
expect will explain wage differences between individuals. We examine the 
coefficients of caste and male dummy variables in wage regressions using different 
specifications involving the above-mentioned explanatory variables. We find the 
caste and male coefficients to be statistically significant in most of the specifications; 
implying the existence of wage differences not fully accounted for by explanatory 
factors. However the magnitude of the caste coefficient is much smaller than the 
magnitude of the male coefficient. Having established that there are unexplained 
wage gaps, we examine the magnitude of this unexplained component. 
The extent of the wage gap is estimated using two main techniques, namely 
the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition and the Brown occupational decomposition 
techniques. The former method decomposes the wage gap into explained and 
unexplained components. This method assumes that all the differences in productive 
characteristics are explained wage differences and the residual component is 
attributed to discrimination. There is however a drawback to this method if we are not 
able to control for all observable and unobservable productive characteristics that 
affect an individual’s wages. This is the omitted ability problem. However if we don’t 
expect the unobservable factors to be changing systematically over time, then we can 
expect it to be influencing wages in each period in the same manner, such that 
analysis of changes over time are not affected. Using Oaxaca-Blinder 
decompositions, we find that, once industries and occupations are controlled for, 
observable characteristics of workers and jobs explain almost the entire wage 
differentials between castes. The result for gender groups is however different: almost 
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half the wage gap between male and female workers is unexplained even after 
controlling for occupations, industries, workers’ and jobs’ characteristics. 
We use the occupational decomposition technique to further examine the 
wage gap in the specific context of the occupations that individuals choose. Usually 
occupational dummy variables are included in earnings regressions to account for 
wage differences across occupations. But this method considers the possibility that 
pre-labor market discrimination might result in occupations being chosen in a 
discriminatory manner such that if we account for this difference in occupational 
structure between different groups, we might be able to better explain the continued 
existence of a wage gap. The occupation-based decomposition analyses show that the 
differences in occupational attainment are not statistically significant, and wage 
discrimination is the primary cause of wage gaps for female and male workers, while 
most of the wage gap is explained for low and high caste workers. We conclude that 
within-occupation discrimination in India is particularly important for women and not 
so important for lower castes, while discrimination in access to occupations is not 
significant for either group. Part of this may be explained by the affirmative action 
programs, some of which include providing subsidized schooling and higher 
education, and coaching to prepare for entrance exams, besides reservations in 
government sector jobs for lower castes. These wage decomposition results indicate 
that for those who do manage to get the education, there are clearly fewer hurdles in 
accessing jobs. Since a major part of the wage gap is still explained differences in 
productive characteristics, improving access to education for minorities would be a 
step in the right direction.  
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Chapter 3 of the dissertation uses the changes in trade policies observed in 
India during the 1990’s to test the taste-based theory of discrimination due to Becker. 
 Liberalization of the economy (reduction in tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers and 
deregulation) increased the degree of competition thereby reducing the scope for 
employer discrimination due to lower rents. We use the reduction in import tariffs and 
non-tariff barriers implemented in India as an exogenous shock to the degree of 
competition in the Indian economy. We evaluate in particular the impact of the 
change in the degree of competition on wage discrimination against women and lower 
caste workers.  
Consistent with Becker’s theory of discrimination and with the results from 
Chapter 2, we find that industries that experience more liberalization experience a 
proportionately higher reduction in the wage differential between women and men. 
The impact on wages of caste groups was however not statistically significant. This 
result is relevant both as a contribution to the empirical literature on the economics of 
discrimination and as a policy analysis of the economic impacts of trade reforms in 
India. Previous empirical evidence on the impact of trade liberalization on gender 
discrimination has been mixed. The result from our analyses is evidence in favor of 
Becker’s theory. Welfare effects of trade liberalization in India are still the subject of 
debate, so an important input into the discussion is whether increased openness was 
associated with reduced discrimination or not. The analysis in this dissertation 
provides valuable support in evidence of a beneficial effect in terms of lowered male-
female wage gaps as a result of increased competition through trade reforms.    
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Tables & Figures 
1 Placeholder for chapter 1 
Table 1.1 Work Force Participation Rates for Social Groups in Urban India 
Year Scheduled Castes Others (not including STs) 







1983 490 205 514 139 
1987-88 492 213 509 140 
1993-94 505 199 523 145 
1999-00 503 185 522 128 
Source: Sarvekshana, 87th Volume, Government of India. 
Notes: Numbers are for all workers (reported using the ‘usual’ status).  They represent 
number of persons employed per 1000 persons in India as a whole. ‘Usual status’ includes 
persons who had, for a relatively longer period of the year, either worked or were looking for 
work, and also those from among the remaining population who had at least for some time 
with some regularity. 
ST is scheduled tribes, i.e. backward tribes who were listed in the Constitution and provided 
with reservations (7.5%) in government jobs. For 1999-00, ‘Others’ includes Other Backward 
Classes (i.e. groups other than Scheduled Castes who were included in another list eligible for 
reservations in 1989). 
 
Table 1.2 Work Force Participation Rates for Males and Females in Urban India  
Year Category of Work Male Female 
1983 Principal status 500 120 
1987-88 Principal status 496 118 
1993-94 Principal status 513 121 
1999-00 Principal status 513 117 
Source: Sarvekshana, 87th Volume, GOI. [Nos. in %] 
Notes: Numbers are Number of persons employed per 1000 persons according to the usual 
status for all of India. ‘Usual status’ includes persons who had, for a relatively longer period 
of the year, either worked or were looking for work, and also those from among the remaining 
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2 Placeholder for Chapter 2 






















 1983-84 1987-88 1993-94 1999-2000 
Real Weekly 
Earnings (Rs.) 247.86 179.04 394.99 270.24 318.24 229.90 401.95 308.55 
Age 35.0 34.3 35.7 34.5 36.1 34.7 36.6 35.3 
Proportion (in %) of each group having: 
No education‡ 21.1 49.2 17.7 48.2 16.4 43.6 14.3 36.9 
Below Primary 10.3 14.0 10.1 14.2 9.2 13.1 7.5 12.2 
Primary 
Education 16.2 15.6 15.8 15.8 12.3 14.3 10.2 13.6 
Middle School 
Education 17.2 11.8 14.8 11.7 15.9 13.6 16.8 16.6 
Secondary 
Education 22.3 7.4 24.3 7.6 26.2 11.5 29.3 15.2 
Graduate 12.9 2.1 17.4 2.6 20.1 4.0 22.1 5.6 
Proportion (in %) of each group in following industries: 
Agriculture 11.6 14.1 9.4 14.9 10.3 16.3 7.8 11.8 
Manufacturing 25.2 23.5 24.9 22.6 22.8 18.4 12.6 9.7 
Services** 24.4 28.9 25.3 27.8 26.4 28.3 4.9 9.1 
Proportion (in %) of each group in following occupations: 
Professionals 6.4 1.5 7.3 2.0 7.9 2.1 7.8 2.8 
Service*** 9.5 19.7 8.9 18.6 8.2 15.8 8.7 16.3 
Production 13.6 25.0 12.6 25.3 12.9 28.0 14.3 28.0 
N 39,621 6,425 41,971 6,560 42,459 6,782 41,711 8,070 
*Non-scheduled castes and tribes are neither scheduled castes nor scheduled tribes. These figures are for urban areas in 16 states.   
**Community, Social and Personal Services. *** This includes hotel & restaurant workers, maids etc.  
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Table 2.2 Summary Statistics for Male and Female Workers 
Variables Males Females Males Females Males Females Males Females 
 1983-84 1987-88 1993-94 1999-2000 
Real Weekly 
Earnings (Rs.) 257.89 145.44 398.01 288.43 327.64 217.59 406.28 300.53 
Age 35.0 34.9 35.5 35.4 35.9 35.9 36.4 36.4 
Proportion (in %) of each group having: 
No education‡ 18.4 56.2 15.8 48.8 14.5 43.3 13.1 39.2 
Below Primary 11.5 7.9 11.1 8.4 10.0 8.4 8.3 8.2 
Primary 
Education 17.5 9.9 17.1 9.7 13.1 10.0 11.1 9.1 
Middle School 
Education 18.6 6.0 16.1 6.3 17.4 8.2 18.2 10.4 
Secondary 
Education 22.1 11.3 24.1 12.7 26.6 14.0 29.5 15.8 
Graduate 12.0 8.6 15.7 14.1 18.4 16.1 19.9 17.3 
Proportion (in %) of each group in following industries: 
Agriculture 9.4 23.8 8.0 20.0 8.6 21.4 6.7 16.4 
Manufacturing 25.3 23.2 24.8 23.4 22.5 20.5 13.3 6.9 
Services* 22.9 34.8 23.1 37.1 23.8 38.1 4.0 12.7 
Proportion (in %) of each group in following occupations: 
Professionals 4.7 10.5 5.1 13.2 5.5 13.6 5.4 14.1 
Service** 9.2 18.8 8.5 18.0 7.9 15.0 8.3 17.3 
Production 16.1 10.6 15.3 9.8 16.2 10.2 18.0 9.9 
N 38,007 8,039 39,722 8,809 39,594 9,647 40,613 9,168 
These figures are for urban areas in 16 states.  *Community, Social and Personal Services. ** This includes hotel & restaurant 
workers, maids etc. 
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Table 2.3 Wage Regressions for the Entire Sample 
Dependent Variable: Natural log of real weekly earnings 
Panel A: Without education x caste and education x male 
 1983-84 1987 1993-94 1999-2000 































































Adjusted R2 0.5704 0.5437 0.4324 0.5828 
N 27,953 29,160 28,610 28,376 
Panel B: Including education x caste, education x male 
 1983-84 1987 1993-94 1999-2000 































































Adjusted R2 0.5799 0.5500 0.4394 0.5858 
N 27,953 29,160 28,610 28,376 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. Each regression also includes 
cubic and quartic terms in age, state, industry and occupation fixed effects; and 3 dummy variables which indicate the quarter of the year in 
which individual was surveyed. 
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Table 2.4  Wage Regressions for the Entire Sample: With and Without Occupation Fixed Effects 
Dependent Variable: Natural log of real weekly earnings 
Panel A: Without occupation in the regression 
 1983-84 1987 1993-94 1999-2000 































































Adjusted R2 0.5654 0.5365 0.4276 0.5736 
N 27,953 29,160 28,610 28,376 
Panel B: Including Occupation in the regression 































































Adjusted R2 0.5765 0.5494 0.4376 0.5914 
N 27,953 29,160 28,610 28,376 
Note: The dependent variable in each regression is the natural log of real weekly earnings. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * 
Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. Each regression also includes education variables x age interactions; cubic and 
quartic terms in age; state and industry fixed effects; and 3 dummy variables which indicate the quarter of the year in which individual was 
surveyed. 
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Table 2.5 Wage Regressions for Male and Female Workers Separately- Including Education x 
Age 
Dependent Variable: Natural log of real weekly earnings 
Panel A: Male Wage Earners 
 1983-84 1987 1993-94 1999-2000 
























































Adjusted R2 0.5328 0.5120 0.3909 0.5704 
N 23,001 23,757 22,974 23,042 
Panel B: Female Wage Earners 
























































Adjusted R2 0.5707 0.5736 0.4873 0.6067 
N 4,952 5,403 5,636 5,334 
Note: The dependent variable in each regression is the natural log of real weekly earnings. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * 
Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. Each regression also includes cubic and quartic terms in age, education x age; state, 
industry and occupation fixed effects; and 3 dummy variables which indicate the quarter of the year in which individual was surveyed. 
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Table 2.6 Wage Regressions for Low and High Caste Workers Separately – Including Education 
x Age 
Dependent Variable: Natural log of real weekly earnings 
Panel A: Low Caste Wage Earners 
 1983-84 1987 1993-94 1999-2000 
























































Adjusted R2 0.4303 0.4164 0.3584 0.5143 
N 4,475 4,432 4,662 5,462 
Panel B: High Caste Wage Earners 
























































Adjusted R2 0.5887 0.5527 0.4360 0.5948 
N 23,478 24,728 23,948 22,914 
Note: The dependent variable in each regression is the natural log of real weekly earnings. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * 
Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. Each regression also includes cubic and quartic terms in age, education x age; state, 
industry and occupation fixed effects; and 3 dummy variables which indicate the quarter of the year in which individual was surveyed. 
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Table 2.7 Wage Regressions for Male and Female Workers Separately – Including Education x 
Age and Education x Caste 
Dependent Variable: Natural log of real weekly earnings 
Panel A: Male Wage Earners 
 1983-84 1987 1993-94 1999-2000 
























































Adjusted R2 0.5330 0.5121 0.3914 0.5706 
N 23,001 23,757 22,974 23,042 
Panel B: Female Wage Earners 
























































Adjusted R2 0.5714 0.5739 0.4871 0.6070 
N 4,952 5,403 5,636 5,334 
Note: The dependent variable in each regression is the natural log of real weekly earnings. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * 
Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. Each regression also includes cubic and quartic terms in age, education x age, 
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Table 2.8 Wage Regressions for Low and High Caste Workers Separately – Including Education 
x Age and Education x Male 
Dependent Variable: Natural log of real weekly earnings 
Panel A: Low Caste Wage Earners 
 1983-84 1987 1993-94 1999-2000 
























































Adjusted R2 0.4335 0.4187 0.3623 0.5182 
N 4,475 4,432 4,662 5,462 
Panel B: High Caste Wage Earners 
























































Adjusted R2 0.6000 0.5603 0.4436 0.5984 
N 23,478 24,728 23,948 22,914 
Note: The dependent variable in each regression is the natural log of real weekly earnings. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * 
Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. Each regression also includes cubic and quartic terms in age, education x age, 
education x male; state, industry and occupation fixed effects; and 3 dummy variables which indicate the quarter of the year in which individual 
was surveyed. 
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Table 2.9  Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition for Gender Groups  
Part of the Gap Explained By 
 Log Wage Gap 
Std Error 
of Wage 
Gap Total EDU OCC 
Total Unexplained 
‘Discrimination’ Std Error 
Panel A: Based on Males as the ‘No-Discrimination’ Model (not weighted) 
1983 0.825 0.016*** 0.308 0.151 -0.010 0.517 0.021*** 
1987 0.685 0.017*** 0.240 0.123 0.016 0.445 0.021*** 
1993 0.654 0.017*** 0.174 0.088 0.013 0.480 0.023*** 
1999 0.550 0.017*** 0.250 0.081 -0.040 0.300 0.019*** 
Panel B: Based on Weights from the Pooled Model 
1983 0.824 0.016*** 0.413 0.147 0.038 0.364 0.010*** 
1987 0.685 0.017*** 0.321 0.148 0.021 0.390 0.011*** 
1993 0.654 0.017*** 0.280 0.125 0.035 0.374 0.012*** 
1999 0.550 0.017*** 0.279 0.097 -0.022 0.271 0.009*** 
Note: The model includes 5 education dummy variables; 4th order polynomial in age; state, industry and occupation, period surveyed fixed 
effects. EDU is education & OCC is occupation The last column represents standard error of the unexplained component. ***Significant at 
1%. 
 
Table 2.10  Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition for Caste Groups 
Part of the Gap Explained By 
 Log Wage Gap 
Std Error 
of Wage 
Gap Total EDU OCC 
Total Unexplained 
‘Discrimination’ Std Error 
Panel A: Based on Higher Castes as the ‘No-Discrimination’ Model (not weighted) 
1983 0.427 0.014*** 0.402 0.263 0.060 0.025 0.011** 
1987 0.532 0.015*** 0.513 0.322 0.092 0.019 0.013 
1993 0.458 0.016*** 0.471 0.277 0.095 -0.013 0.014 
1999 0.436 0.014*** 0.416 0.249 0.076 0.021 0.011** 
Panel B: Based on Weights from the Pooled Model 
1983 0.427 0.014*** 0.394 0.255 0.060 0.033 0.010*** 
1987 0.532 0.015*** 0.500 0.313 0.091 0.032 0.011*** 
1993 0.458 0.016*** 0.458 0.263 0.097 0.000 0.012 
1999 0.436 0.014*** 0.409 0.238 0.078 0.027 0.009*** 
Note: The model includes 5 education, gender, marital status & household size dummy variables; 4th order polynomial in age; state, 
industry and occupation, period surveyed fixed effects. EDU is education & OCC is occupation The last column represents standard error of 
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Table 2.11  Reference for Occupation-Based Decomposition Tables 
1. Columns (1) and (2) show the actual proportion of Males (Pm), females (Pf), higher caste (Pn) and 
lower caste (Psc) workers in the sample, while column (4) shows the predicted probability ( ˆ
mP ) of 
female and lower caste ( scP̂  ) workers being in different occupations assuming they made 
occupational choices as if they were males and non-scheduled castes, respectively.  
2. Column (5) thus is the observed differences in occupational difference, and is decomposed into 
unexplained and explained parts in columns (6) and (7).   
3. Column (8) is the difference in average log wages of non-sc and sc workers in each occupational 
group, and this is decomposed into an explained part (column 9) and an unexplained part (column 10). 
 4. Columns (11)-(14) is the further decomposition of the earnings differential into explained part of 
wage differential (column 11), unexplained wage differential (12), difference due to job differences 
(col. 13), and job discrimination (col. 14).  
 
 

















f̂ fP P−  
Occupation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Skilled 0.146 0.033 0.146 0.142 0.113 0.004 0.109 
Professional 0.143 0.227 0.143 0.107 -0.084 0.035 -0.119 
Clerical 0.224 0.121 0.224 0.172 0.103 0.052 0.051 
Service 0.098 0.233 0.098 0.110 -0.135 -0.012 -0.122 
Unskilled 0.276 0.253 0.276 0.336 0.023 -0.059 0.082 
Production 0.112 0.133 0.112 0.133 -0.021 -0.020 -0.001 
 
 G= lnYn-lnYsc 
E= 
( )m m ff x x−
 
D= 
( )f m fx f f−
 fP E×
 





 ˆ( )f fP P−
 
x lnYn 
 (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Skilled 1.300 0.372 0.928 0.012 0.031 0.024 0.622 
Professional 0.543 0.175 0.368 0.040 0.083 0.230 -0.778 
Clerical 0.094 0.030 0.064 0.004 0.008 0.320 0.314 
Service 1.039 0.287 0.753 0.067 0.175 -0.070 -0.688 
Unskilled 1.038 0.204 0.834 0.052 0.211 -0.317 0.442 
Production 1.212 0.315 0.897 0.042 0.119 -0.112 -0.003 







    WE WD JE JD 
Notes: m, f refer to males and females respectively. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  
a Significant at 1%. Refer to Table 2.11 for notes on interpreting numbers in each column. 
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Table 2.13 Occupation-based Decomposition of Wage Gap for Gender Groups in 1987  













f̂ fP P−  
Occupation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Skilled 0.143 0.043 0.143 0.135 0.099 0.007 0.092 
Professional 0.169 0.300 0.169 0.154 -0.131 0.015 -0.146 
Clerical 0.234 0.142 0.234 0.199 0.093 0.035 0.058 
Service 0.098 0.183 0.098 0.105 -0.086 -0.007 -0.079 
Unskilled 0.262 0.227 0.262 0.302 0.034 -0.041 0.075 
Production 0.095 0.105 0.095 0.104 -0.010 -0.009 0.000 
 
 G= lnYn-lnYsc 
E= 
( )m m ff x x−
 
D= 
( )f m fx f f−
 fP E×
 





 ˆ( )f fP P−
 
x lnYn 
 (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Skilled 1.321 0.455 0.866 0.020 0.037 0.043 0.539 
Professional 0.491 0.114 0.377 0.034 0.113 0.101 -0.998 
Clerical 0.021 0.015 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.221 0.366 
Service 1.059 0.273 0.785 0.050 0.144 -0.040 -0.455 
Unskilled 0.996 0.258 0.737 0.059 0.168 -0.225 0.414 
Production 1.159 0.436 0.723 0.046 0.076 -0.054 -0.001 







    WE WD JE JD 
Notes: m, f refer to males and females respectively. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  
a Significant at 1%. Refer to Table 2.11 for notes on interpreting numbers in each column. 
 
Table 2.14 Occupation-based Decomposition of Wage Gap for Gender Groups in 1993  













f̂ fP P−  
Occupation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Skilled 0.150 0.032 0.150 0.131 0.117 0.019 0.099 
Professional 0.177 0.304 0.177 0.174 -0.127 0.003 -0.130 
Clerical 0.201 0.158 0.201 0.182 0.043 0.019 0.024 
Service 0.091 0.172 0.091 0.093 -0.082 -0.002 -0.080 
Unskilled 0.290 0.228 0.290 0.328 0.062 -0.038 0.101 
Production 0.092 0.106 0.092 0.092 -0.014 -0.001 -0.014 
 
 G= lnYn-lnYsc 
E= 
( )m m ff x x−
 
D= 
( )f m fx f f−
 fP E×
 





 ˆ( )f fP P−
 
x lnYn 
 (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Skilled 1.033 0.347 0.686 0.011 0.022 0.110 0.586 
Professional 0.478 0.147 0.331 0.045 0.101 0.020 -0.878 
Clerical 0.098 0.030 0.068 0.005 0.011 0.123 0.152 
Service 1.098 0.365 0.732 0.063 0.126 -0.011 -0.464 
Unskilled 0.894 0.206 0.688 0.047 0.157 -0.213 0.560 
Production 1.174 0.281 0.893 0.030 0.095 -0.004 -0.078 







    WE WD JE JD 
Notes: m, f refer to males and females respectively. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
 a Significant at 1%. Refer to Table 2.11 for notes on interpreting numbers in each column. 
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Table 2.15 Occupation-based Decomposition of Wage Gap for Gender Groups in 1999  













f̂ fP P−  
Occupation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Skilled 0.155 0.030 0.155 0.134 0.125 0.020 0.105 
Professional 0.170 0.330 0.170 0.170 -0.159 0.001 -0.160 
Clerical 0.186 0.154 0.186 0.169 0.032 0.017 0.015 
Service 0.098 0.180 0.098 0.104 -0.082 -0.007 -0.075 
Unskilled 0.314 0.220 0.314 0.345 0.093 -0.032 0.125 
Production 0.078 0.087 0.078 0.077 -0.009 0.001 -0.010 
 
 G= lnYn-lnYsc 
E= 
( )m m ff x x−
 
D= 
( )f m fx f f−
 fP E×
 





 ˆ( )f fP P−
 
x lnYn 
 (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Skilled 0.721 0.291 0.430 0.009 0.013 0.124 0.639 
Professional 0.539 0.161 0.378 0.053 0.124 0.004 -1.129 
Clerical 0.091 0.071 0.020 0.011 0.003 0.113 0.100 
Service 0.974 0.393 0.581 0.071 0.104 -0.040 -0.456 
Unskilled 0.797 0.208 0.589 0.046 0.130 -0.184 0.722 
Production 0.958 0.202 0.755 0.018 0.066 0.005 -0.059 







    WE WD JE JD 
Notes: m, f refer to males and females respectively. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
 a Significant at 1%. Refer to Table 2.11 for notes on interpreting numbers in each column. 
Table 2.16 Occupation-based Decomposition of Wage Gap for Caste Groups in 1983  









 nP  scP  nP̂  scP̂  scn PP −  nP - scP̂  scP̂ - scP  
Occupation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Skilled 0.146 0.114 0.146 0.166 0.033 -0.020 0.053 
Professional 0.143 0.032 0.143 0.051 0.110 0.091 0.019 
Clerical 0.224 0.131 0.224 0.126 0.094 0.098 -0.005 
Service 0.098 0.177 0.098 0.121 -0.080 -0.023 -0.056 
Unskilled 0.276 0.397 0.276 0.388 -0.120 -0.112 -0.009 
Production 0.112 0.149 0.112 0.147 -0.036 -0.035 -0.002 
 
 G= lnYn-lnYsc 
E= 
( )n n scf x x−
 
D= 




scP * D 
ˆ
n scP P−  
x lnYn 
( scP̂ - scP ) 
*lnYn 
 (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Skilled 0.324 0.252 0.072 0.029 0.008 -0.115 0.301 
Professional 0.439 0.268 0.171 0.009 0.006 0.594 0.124 
Clerical 0.215 0.165 0.051 0.022 0.007 0.601 -0.028 
Service 0.041 0.038 0.003 0.007 0.000 -0.131 -0.317 
Unskilled 0.263 0.118 0.145 0.047 0.058 -0.598 -0.046 
Production 0.026 0.002 0.024 0.000 0.004 -0.193 -0.011 







    WE WD JE JD 
Notes: n =non-scheduled (higher) castes & sc =scheduled (lower) castes.  Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
 a Significant at 1%.  Refer to Table 2.11 for additional notes. 
 
 





Table 2.17 Occupation-based Decomposition of Wage Gap for Caste Groups in 1987 









 nP  scP  nP̂  scP̂  scn PP −  nP - scP̂  scP̂ - scP  
Occupation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Skilled 0.143 0.145 0.143 0.163 -0.002 -0.020 0.018 
Professional 0.169 0.043 0.169 0.052 0.126 0.117 0.009 
Clerical 0.234 0.124 0.234 0.133 0.110 0.101 0.009 
Service 0.098 0.170 0.098 0.126 -0.072 -0.028 -0.044 
Unskilled 0.262 0.395 0.262 0.392 -0.134 -0.131 -0.003 
Production 0.095 0.123 0.095 0.133 -0.028 -0.038 0.010 
 
 G= lnYn-lnYsc 
E= 
( )n n scf x x−
 
D= 




scP * D 
ˆ
n scP P−  
x lnYn 
( scP̂ - scP ) 
*lnYn 
 (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Skilled 0.347 0.208 0.140 0.030 0.020 -0.120 0.107 
Professional 0.566 0.400 0.166 0.017 0.007 0.796 0.063 
Clerical 0.204 0.159 0.045 0.020 0.006 0.640 0.060 
Service 0.112 0.164 -0.052 0.028 -0.009 -0.163 -0.256 
Unskilled 0.301 0.101 0.200 0.040 0.079 -0.722 -0.016 
Production 0.014 0.056 -0.042 0.007 -0.005 -0.219 0.059 







    WE WD JE JD 
Notes: n =non-scheduled (higher) castes & sc =scheduled (lower) castes. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
 a Significant at 1%.  Refer to Table 2.11 for additional notes. 
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Table 2.18 Occupation-based Decomposition of Wage Gap for Caste Groups in 1993  









 nP  scP  nP̂  scP̂  scn PP −  nP - scP̂  scP̂ - scP  
Occupation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Skilled 0.150 0.122 0.150 0.161 0.028 -0.011 0.039 
Professional 0.177 0.047 0.177 0.062 0.130 0.115 0.015 
Clerical 0.201 0.109 0.201 0.113 0.092 0.088 0.004 
Service 0.091 0.145 0.091 0.115 -0.055 -0.024 -0.031 
Unskilled 0.290 0.478 0.290 0.418 -0.188 -0.128 -0.059 
Production 0.092 0.099 0.092 0.131 -0.007 -0.039 0.032 
 
 G= lnYn-lnYsc 
E= 
( )n n scf x x−
 
D= 




scP * D 
ˆ
n scP P−  
x lnYn 
( scP̂ - scP ) 
*lnYn 
 (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Skilled 0.265 0.158 0.107 0.019 0.013 -0.066 0.233 
Professional 0.376 0.227 0.149 0.011 0.007 0.773 0.100 
Clerical 0.124 0.121 0.004 0.013 0.000 0.558 0.024 
Service 0.103 0.137 -0.034 0.020 -0.005 -0.140 -0.180 
Unskilled 0.218 0.133 0.085 0.063 0.041 -0.713 -0.330 
Production -0.012 0.036 -0.048 0.004 -0.005 -0.226 0.186 







    WE WD JE JD 
Notes: n =non-scheduled (higher) castes & sc =scheduled (lower) castes. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
 a Significant at 1%.   Refer to Table 2.11 for additional notes. 
Table 2.19 Occupation-based Decomposition of Wage Gap for Caste Groups in 1999  









 nP  scP  nP̂  scP̂  scn PP −  nP - scP̂  scP̂ - scP  
Occupation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Skilled 0.155 0.140 0.155 0.162 0.015 -0.008 0.022 
Professional 0.170 0.052 0.170 0.072 0.119 0.098 0.020 
Clerical 0.186 0.124 0.186 0.113 0.062 0.073 -0.011 
Service 0.098 0.151 0.098 0.112 -0.053 -0.014 -0.039 
Unskilled 0.314 0.451 0.314 0.442 -0.138 -0.129 -0.009 
Production 0.078 0.082 0.078 0.099 -0.004 -0.021 0.017 
 
 G= lnYn-lnYsc 
E= 
( )n n scf x x−
 
D= 




scP * D 
ˆ
n scP P−  
x lnYn 
( scP̂ - scP ) 
*lnYn 
 (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Skilled 0.255 0.227 0.028 0.032 0.004 -0.046 0.134 
Professional 0.214 0.119 0.096 0.006 0.005 0.695 0.143 
Clerical 0.107 0.122 -0.014 0.015 -0.002 0.486 -0.074 
Service 0.061 0.151 -0.090 0.023 -0.014 -0.086 -0.235 
Unskilled 0.215 0.117 0.099 0.053 0.044 -0.742 -0.052 
Production 0.077 0.089 -0.012 0.007 -0.001 -0.125 0.099 







    WE WD JE JD 
Notes: n =non-scheduled (higher) castes & sc =scheduled (lower) castes.  Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
 a Significant at 1%, b Significant at 5% in a 1-tail t-test. Refer to Table 2.11 for additional notes. 
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 Figure 1: Profits of Discriminating and Non-Discriminating Firms 
3 
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Placeholder for Chapter 3 
Table 3.1 Summary Statistics by Gender and Caste in 72 Industries 
 1983 Female               Male 
1999-00 
Female              Male 
1983 
SC               Non-SC 
1999-00 
SC               Non-SC 
Real Weekly 
Earnings (Rs.) 80.1 296.3 133.6 401.2 208.1 274.1 308.5 369.9 
Earnings Ratio 0.27  0.33  0.76  0.83  
Age 31.6 33.3 31.6 34.5 32.7 33.1 32.9 34.3 
Proportion (%)         
No formal 2.2 2.7 0.9 0.8 2.9 2.6 2.3 0.6 
Below Primary 9.6 12.4 10.7 10.2 18.3 11.3 15.4 9.5 
Primary 17.8 20.3 17.8 13.8 19.9 20.0 16.1 14.1 
Middle 11.8 19.4 17.2 19.6 15.6 18.7 22.5 18.7 
Secondary 9.7 20.1 15.2 30.0 9.7 19.8 18.1 29.3 
Other Grad 2.2 6.1 5.5 11.2 0.5 6.2 2.8 11.5 
Married 56.7 70.6 55.7 71.5 73.7 68.1 69.7 69.1 
N 1,043 6,591 888 5,157 840 6,794 794 5,251 
The sample is restricted to those employed in 72 three-digit industries. 
 
Table 3.2 Summary statistics of Trade measures 







Average Effective Rate 
of Protection 115.1 125.9 80.2 40.4 
Average Import 
Coverage Ratio 97.6 91.6 37.9 24.8 
Average Import 
Penetration Ratio 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.16 
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Table 3.3 Individual Level Results for Entire Sample  
















































































- IPR        -0.065 (.121) 
-IPR x Female        -0.246 (.241) 
-IPR x Caste        -0.120 (.271) 



























Industry   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




    Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry x PostLib 
x Female, 
Industry x PostLib 
x Caste 
     Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation 





      Yes Yes 
Demographic 
characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R squared 0.4989 0.5060 0.5442 0.5538 0.5708 0.5777 0.5864 0.5865 
No. of 
Observations 14844 14844 14844 14844 14844 14844 14844 14844 
Notes: Dependent variable is log of real weekly earnings of each individual. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Sample is restricted to 
Hindus. All regressions include age (quartic), education, married, head, state, female, caste, education*female, education*caste. * denotes 
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Table 3.4 Individual Level Results for Entire Sample – Additional Specifications with PostLib  

































































































































































ERP x PostLib x 









ERP x PostLib x 
















-IPR x PostLib x 







-IPR x PostLib x 





ICR, ICR x Female, 
ICR x Caste      Yes Yes 
ICR x Post, 
ICR x Post x Female, 
ICR x Post x Caste 
      Yes 
Ind x Post x Female; 
Ind  x Post x Caste   Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Occupation; 
Occupation x Female; 
Occupation x Caste 
Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R squared 0.5801 0.5717 0.5868 0.5875 0.5876 0.5878 0.5881 
No. of Observations 14844 14844 14844 14844 14844 14794 14794 
Notes: Dependent variable is log of weekly earnings of each individual. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The standard errors are 
clustered by industry. Sample is restricted to Hindus. All regressions include age (quartic), education, married, head; state, education x female, 
education x caste, education x ERP, industry, industry x PostLib, industry x female, industry x caste; Concentration measured by Percentage 
Change in Number of Firms between 1983 and 1999 relative to 1983; and real gross fixed capital formation.  
* denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 3.5  Individual Level Results for Gender Groups (Higher Caste Hindus Only)  































Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
PostLib    Yes Yes Yes 
Industry x PostLib      Yes 
R squared 0.4742 0.4779 0.5284 0.5289 0.5300 0.5396 
No. of Observations 12,823 12,823 12,823 12,823 12,823 12,823 
Notes: Dependent variable is log of weekly earnings of each individual. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Standard errors are clustered 
by industry. Sample is restricted to higher castes. Demographic variables include age(quartic), education dummies, married, head. 
* denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, *** denotes significance at the 1% level.  
 Table 3.6 Individual Level Results for Gender Groups- Additional Specifications 




































































Occupation   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation x Female    Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Industry x Female     Yes Yes Yes 
Industry x PostLib x Female      Yes Yes 
% Change in No. Firms       Yes 
Real Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation       Yes 
R squared 0.5551 0.5571 0.5652 0.5681 0.5799 0.5852 0.5853 
No. of Observations 12823 12823 12823 12823 12823 12823 12823 
Notes: Dependent variable is log of real weekly earnings. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Each regression includes demographic 
characteristics; industry, industry x PostLib, PostLib, and state dummies. Standard errors are clustered by industry.  * denotes significance at the 10% 
level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 3.7 Individual Level Results for Gender Groups – Additional Specifications with ERP x 
PostLib 


















































































Concentration, GFKF   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation dummies    Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation * Female     Yes Yes 
R squared 0.5732 0.5735 0.5736 0.5814 0.5824 0.5826 
No. of Observations 12823 12823 12823 12823 12823 12786 
Notes: Dependent variable is log of weekly earnings of each individual. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Sample is restricted 
to higher castes Standard errors are clustered by industry.  
All regressions include demographic characteristics, state, education x female, education x ERP, industry, industry x PostLib, industry x 
female, ERP, IPR, ERP x PostLib, IPR x PostLib. #column 19 includes ICR, ICR x female, ICR x postlib, ICR  x postlib x female. * denotes 
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Industries with highest ERP in 1983 
Fabricated Structural Metal Products 428.7 50.6 8.20 10.04 88 
Iron & Steel 225.2 51.7 8.11 9.36 77 
Cells & Batteries 199.9 61.8 0.00 8.26 69 
Synthetic Rubber 173.1 40.6 8.92 10.52 77 
Paints, Varnishes 171.7 39.2 6.28 2.46 77 
Industries with lowest ERP in 1983 
Agricultural Machinery, Equipments etc 30.4 27.9 3.30 0.00 8.0 
Locomotives and Parts 47.1 28.8 4.36 5.57 39 
Food and Textile Machinery 48.7 29.3 0.00 4.95 40 
Fertilizers and Pesticides 50.8 28.7 2.93 5.57 44 
Wires and Cables 51.5 66.5 5.60 1.26 -29 
Notes: ERP denotes Effective Rate of Protection. % Female denotes percentage of female workers in each industry.  
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Table 3.9 Individual Level Results for Caste Groups (Male Hindus Only)  
























































































Concentration, GFKF   Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation dummies    Yes Yes 
Occupation * Caste     Yes 
R squared 0.5235 0.5236 0.5237 0.5322 0.5323 
No. of Observations 13,322 13,322 13,322 13,322 13,322 
Notes: Dependent variable is log of weekly earnings of each individual. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Sample is 
restricted to males. Standard errors are clustered by industry.  
All regressions include demographic characteristics, state, education x caste, education x ERP, industry, industry x PostLib, 
industry x caste, ERP, IPR, ICR, ERP x PostLib, IPR*PostLib, ICR*PostLib. 
 *denotes significance at 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
 
  
Figure 2: Trends in Effective Rate of Protection in 1983 and 1999 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A.  Data 
A.1 List of States 
Table A1: List of States in India 
 Included States  Other States  & Union Territories 
1 Andhra Pradesh 9 Madhya Pradesh 17 Arunachal Pradesh Andaman & Nicobar Islands 
2 Bihar 10 Maharashtra 18 Assam Chandigarh 
3 Delhi 11 Orissa 19 Manipur Dadra & Nagar Haveli 
4 Gujarat 12 Punjab 20 Meghalaya Daman & Diu 
5 Haryana 13 Rajasthan 21 Mizoram Lakshdweep 
6 Himachal Pradesh 14 Tamil Nadu 22 Nagaland Pondicherry 
7 Karnataka 15 Uttar Pradesh 23 Sikkim  
8 Kerala 16 West Bengal 24 Tripura  
    25 Goa  
    26 Jammu & Kashmir  
States 1 to 16 is included in the analysis. The Union Territories and States listed in 17-26 are not included. Post 2000, Bihar was 
further divided into Bihar and Jharkhand; Madhya Pradesh was divided into Chattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh; Uttar Pradesh was 
divided into Uttaranchal and Uttar Pradesh.  
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A.2   List of Industries with Tariff Information 
Table A2 List of Industries 
Code Three-Digit Classification Code Three-Digit Classification 
NIC-87 Description NIC-87 Description 
230, 231, 
232, 235 W&F cotton Khadi 331 Iron And Steel in SF form 
233 W&F of Cotton- Handloom 332 Ferro Alloys 
234 W&F of Cotton-Powerloom 333 Copper Manufacturing 
335 Aluminum manufacturing 236 , 260 
262, 267 
Printing of Cotton Textiles  
Knitted or Crocheted Textiles 336 Zinc Manufacturing 
338+ 339 Metal scraps & Non Ferrous 263  
265 
Blankets,Shawl,Carpets& Rugs 
 Textile Garments &Accessories 340 Fab Structural Metal Prods 
268,269 Textile Products nec 341 Fab Structural Metal nec 
290 
291 
Tanning and Curing of Leather 
Leather Footwear 342 Furniture & Fixtures 
346 Metal Kitchen Ware 292  
293 
Apparel of Leather & Subs  
Leather Products & Substitutes 343+349 Hand-tools, Weights etc 
299 Leather & Fur Products nec 




Agricultural machinery, Equipments & Parts  
Construction /Mining Machinery  
Prime Movers & Boilers 




Food & Textile Machinery  
Other Machinery 
Refrigerators & Air conditioners 
302+306 Synthetic Rubber & Manmade Fiber 356 357 
General Purpose Machinery  
Machine-Tools & Accessories 
     303 Paints, Varnishes etc 358 Office & Computing Machinery 
359 Special Purpose Machinery 304 
 305 
Drugs & Medicines  
Perfumes, Cosmetics & lotions 360 Electrical Industrial Machinery 
308 Explosives etc 361 Wires & Cables 
309 Chemical Products nec 362 Cells & Batteries 
310 Tires & Tubes 365+366 363 
Radio & TV 
Lamps & Domestic Appliances 
311 Rubber & Plastic Footwear 368 Electronic Valves & Tubes 
312 Rubber Products nec 369  370 
X-ray Machinery  
Ships and Boats 
313 Plastic Products nec 371 Locomotives & Parts 
372 
373 + 374 
Wagons & Coaches 
Motor Vehicles, Cars & products. 314 316 
Refined Petroleum Products 
Refined Petro Products, nec 377 Aircraft & related products 
318 Coke Oven Products 379 Transport equipment nec 
319 Other Coal Tar Products 375 Motorcycles And parts 
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